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AN "AGE OF [IM]POSSIBILITY": RHETORIC, 
WELFARE REFORM, AND POVERTY 
Lisa A. Crooms* 
THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM. By Joel F. Handler. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. ·1995. Pp. ix, 177. $12. 
LIVING ON THE EDGE: THE REALITIES OF WELFARE IN AMERICA. 
By Mark Robert Rank. New York: Columbia University Press. 
1994. Pp. xii, 266. $14. 
"[P]erhaps most important, we are gaining ground in restoring fun-
damental values. The crime rate, the welfare and food stamp rolls, 
the poverty rate and the teen pregnancy rate are all down. And as 
they go down, prospects for America's future go up. We live in an 
age of possibility."1 
On January 23, 1996, President Bill Clinton so delivered his 
fourth State of the Union address. In it, he defined "our first chal-
lenge: to cherish our children and strengthen the American fam-
ily. "2 Clinton continued: "For too Imig our welfare system has 
undermined the values of family and work instead of supporting 
them .... I challenge people on welfare to make the most of this 
opportunity for independence. And I challenge American b_usi-
nesses to give people on welfare the chance."3 
Clinton's remarks illustrate how the current bipartisan discourse 
about welfare reform frames the issue of poverty as one of moral 
failure and personal irresponsibility fueled by the financial incen-
tives of public assistance.4 Those who view poverty in this way be-
lieve that the social contract imposes on members of society a duty 
to "contribute ... by supporting themselves and their families if 
they can" (Handler, p. 3), and they see one's ability to fulfill this 
* Visiting Associate Professor, Howard University School of Law. B.A. 1984, Howard 
University; J.D. 1991, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1. President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996), reprinted in N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at A14. 
2. Id. See generally Alison Mitchell, Clinton Offers Challenge to Nation, Declaring, 'Era 
of Big Government Is Over,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al. 
3. Clinton, supra note 1. 
4. See Rank, pp. 71-72 (noting that "many contend that because benefits increase with 
the size of a household, women on welfare have a financial incentive to bear more children"); 
see also Michael Wines, 'Not My Job.' 'Not Our Job.' So Whose Job Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
9, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1, 3. 
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duty largely as a matter of individual efforts For the able-bodied, 
failure to discharge this duty raises an irrebuttable presumption of 
personal and civic irresponsibility that strips them of their right to 
human dignity. 6 
This term of the social contract, the defining conundrum of U.S. 
social welfare policy, rests between two conflicting sets of princi-
ples. On the one hand, individualism, opportunity, and liberty lie at 
the center of the liberal foundation of U.S. national identity. 
"Throughout ... history, Americans have enthusiastically embraced 
individualism [and the c]losely associated ... concept of self-
reliance."7 These ideas are coupled with "the widely shared belief 
that the United States is a land where opportunities exist for all 
who are willing to work for them and that individual virtue and 
talent can overshadow the constraints of class, race or ethnicity" 
(Rank, p. 200). On the other hand, real need and poverty, most 
starkly evidenced by the severe maldistribution of wealth, exist in 
this regime that legally protects the rights of property holders while 
affording no parallel legal right to fulfillment of one's basic needs.s 
5. Republicans and Democrats part company at this point. Although both appear inter-
ested in implementing an authoritarian agenda that penalizes the poor for their perceived 
sloth and immorality, they disagree about how best to encourage those on AFDC to make an 
effort to support their families. This is illustrated by their proposals for moving AFDC recip-
ients from welfare to waged work as well as the assumptions on which those proposals are 
based. On the one hand, Democrats tend to support education and job-training programs 
because they believe that the poor are entitled to an equal opportunity to compete in the 
labor market. By emphasizing government-subsidized, human capital development, the 
Democrats both acknowledge that many on welfare Jack basic skills and create a government 
obligation to provide recipients with training in order to realize the goal of equal opportu-
nity. On the other hand, Republicans tend to prioritize immediate job placement based on 
an apparent belief that welfare recipients have all the marketable skills they need to secure 
employment. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that welfare recipients succumb to 
the financial incentives of cash benefits and depend on the program because they lack the 
will to do otherwise. See Handler, pp. 110-38 (discussing the "sharp divisions within Con-
gress, the administration, the states and the public over many of the reform proposals"); see 
also Rank, pp. 25-35 (discussing various explanations or theories of poverty and welfare 
recipiency). 
6. Rank's recounting of a story about a member of the Milwaukee County Board of Su-
pervisors illustrates this conclusion. The board member "proposed that the county govern-
ment begin selling the organs of dead welfare recipients" regardless of consent because "[i]f 
they can't help society while they're alive, maybe they can help it while they're dead." Rank, 
p. 2; see also Rank, p. 39 (noting that most Americans view welfare recipients as failing in 
their civic and social duty, a "highly stigmatized behavior"). 
7. Rank, p. 200; see also Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Property, 31 
WM. & MARY L. REv. 295, 295 (1990) (identifying "liberty, democracy, living under law, 
equality and owning property in an individual way" as "democratic ideals"). 
8. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Economic Rights Under the United States Constitution, 32 
CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 97 (1994); Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process 
and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. LJ. 397 (1994); Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at 
Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 265; see also Carrie E. Johnson, Policy 
and Prejudice, 10 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 134, 136 (1995) ("The argument for limited fed-
eral welfare intervention seems to suggest that economic security is not a citizenship right for 
which the government is responsible, but rather an ideal for which individual citizens must 
strive."); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 
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Within this context, the poor and images of poverty control the be-
havior of the nonpoor and make them honor the terms of the social 
contract (Handler, p. 148). 
Against this backdrop social welfare policy makers construct 
proposals purportedly designed to respond to real need and suffer-
ing without threatening the fundamental values of work, family, 
and social order (Handler, p. 2). To them, public assistance must 
satisfy three requirements: (1) it must not encourage able-bodied 
workers, particularly those in low-wage jobs, to abandon their em-
ployment;9 (2) it must not encourage recipients to abandon proper 
gender roles;10 and (3) it must not facilitate the anarchy and law-
lessness that lie in the wake of the loss of social order (Handler, p. 
2). 
Whether these requirements have anything to do with eradicat-
ing poverty depends entirely on one's views about poverty and its 
causes.11 For those who see poverty as a question of moral failure, 
YALE LJ. 1 (1984) (describing a social vision which compels, inter alia, alleviating misery 
through "adequate and not merely minimal allotments of food, clothing, medical care, shel-
ter"); Bob Herbert, Asleep at the Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at A17 (characteriz-
ing federal moves to cut social welfare programs as "abandoning its responsibility to provide 
even the most minimal level of assistance to Americans left without any other resources"). 
9. According to some commentators, social welfare policy mainly functions to maintain 
labor discipline among low-waged workers. See, e.g., FRANCES A. Fox PIVEN & RICHARD 
CLOWARD, REGULATING TIIE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBUC WELFARE 365-97 (updated 
ed. 1993). As Jack Rothman recently noted, welfare grants remain at low levels in order to 
"pressure people to drop out of the program and [to] join the ranks of cheap labor ... who 
can ... be hired dirt-cheap to work for the big winners in business and industry." Jack 
Rothman, Tinkering Won't Work on Welfare, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at B9; see also PIVEN 
& CLOWARD, supra, at 372 (noting that "[b]y 1990, the maximum benefit was less than half 
the poverty level in a majority of the states, and Jess than a third of that level in a quarter of 
the states"). 
10. I refer to the gender roles that govern family formation and the· division of labor in 
traditional, two-parent families. Women who accept this role must limit their childbearing to 
the confines of the traditional two-parent family. Men in tum must assume primary responsi-
bility for the financial support of their domestic, familial dependents. 
Since the inception of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 
the policymakers have worked to avoid the immorality commonly associated with single 
motherhood. As Handler notes, the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, which 
preceded AFDC, came into being at "the moment of the full flowering of the patriarchal 
domestic code." Predictably, many who "feared that aid to single mothers ... would weaken 
the responsibility of fathers and encourage single parenthood" opposed it. Handler, p. 24. 
The eventual compromise program provided aid to " 'children of worthy character, suffering 
from temporary misfortune, and children of reasonably efficient and deserving mothers.'" 
Handler, p. 24 (footnotes omitted). It purportedly aimed to permit these mothers to focus on 
their primary, domestic caretaking responsibilities, undistracted by waged work. The limits 
on the pool of eligible recipients, however, undermined its ability to remedy poverty. The 
restrictions denied benefits to all poor families except those headed by morally "fit and 
proper" single mothers. Handler, p. 24. The resultant recipient population was virtually all 
white and widowed. See Handler, p. 25. See generally Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single 
Parents, 18 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 19, 24-51 (1995) (discussing the stigmatization of single 
parenthood). 
11. Many scholars have discussed the impact of different perspectives in various contexts. 
For example, Vincene Verdun notes that both the proponents and opponents of reparations 
for black people "approach the issue ••. from two distinct perspectives that are based on 
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placing such requirements on welfare recipients seems completely 
warranted.12 For those who see it as a combination of structural 
flaws and individual behavior, focusing on moral failure misses the 
point.13 This essay considers two books about the current social 
welfare policy discourse which adopt the latter view of poverty and 
criticize the former. Joel F. Handler14 and Mark Robert RanklS 
pose similar questions in order to expose the illusory "logic" of the 
current welfare reform rhetoric. They ask, "Why [is] there so much 
anger [against welfare recipients] with so little evidence to justify 
it?"16 "Why does society cling to the basic assumptions that under-
lie welfare policy when it is so clear that they do not comport with 
reality? . . . What is this incessant need to blame the victim?" 
(Handler, p. 8). 
Both books address these questions, but they do so from differ-
ent perspectives. Handler criticizes the current Democratic and 
Republican proposals to reform the welfare system. He argues that 
these proposals affirm "majoritarian values through the creation of 
deviants" and hold "[t]he poor ... hostage to make sure that the 
rest of us behave" (Handler, p. 9). Rank functions as ethnographer, 
providing a true sense of welfare recipients and proving that they 
are "not that different from you or me - no better, no worse."17 
differences in the beliefs imbedded in the perception of each group." Vincene Verdun, If the 
Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 
610 (1993); see also KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE PoLmCS OF MOTHERHOOD 158-91 
(1984) (discussing the different belief structures or "world views" of opponents and propo-
nents of full reproductive freedom for women); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Sto-
ries, 87 MrcH. L. REv. 2073, 2083-84 (1989) (describing the "perceptual fault lines [or] 
different descriptions of events that grow from different experiences and different 
resonances" at work in legal storytelling); fatricia J. Williams, A/chemical Notes: Recon-
structing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 410-11 (1987) 
(telling a story about how a difference in perceptions between herself and her sister led one 
to see a road as black while the other saw it as purple). 
12. Such individuals explain poverty and welfare dependency as a function of individual 
attitudes, motivation, or culture. Rank, pp. 25-29. 
13. Rank recognizes four structural theories of poverty: (1) Marxism; (2) dual labor-
market theory; (3) functionalism; and (4) the "Big Brother" theory. See Rank, pp. 30-34. 
14. Richard C. Maxwell Professor of Law at the University of California at Los Angeles 
School of Law. 
15. Associate Professor in the George Warren Brown School of Social Work at Washing-
ton University, St. Louis. 
16. Rank, p. 1. Rank begins his book with the following story about his conversation with 
an individual irritated by an editorial Rank wrote about the myths of welfare reform: 
How in the world could I write such nonsense when everyone knew that most welfare 
recipients were black, on the dole for years at a time, living the good life, and so on. 
"But how," I asked, "do you know that?" "Just look around!" he replied. He had no 
need for the data I used to argue my points; for him it was obvious that people on 
welfare were good-for-nothing parasites. 
Rank, p. 1. 
17. Rank, p. 4. According to Rank, this is "[p]erhaps the most salient theme to emerge 
from [his] study." Rank, p. 172. For other ethnographic studies of poor populations, see 
JONATIIAN KozoL, AMAZING GRACE: THE LrvEs OF CHILDREN AND THE CONSCIENCE OF A 
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He sets his sights on the much-maligned welfare queen, determined 
to challenge her primacy in mainstream social welfare policy dis-
course.18 Read together, these authors provide an interlocking ex-
planation and critique of the current mainstream social welfare 
policy proposals.19 
The remainder of this essay is divided into five parts. Part I 
considers the marriage of morality and law within the context of 
social welfare policy, in general, and the Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) program, in particular. Part II discusses 
Handler's views of the welfare reform "Consensus" and "the cul-
ture of poverty" thesis it embraces as evidenced by the assumptions 
on which the Consensus is based. Part III focuses on the Consen-
sus' "work versus welfare" paradigm and seeks to expose the myths 
on which this paradigm relies. These myths include not only that 
welfare recipients do not work for wages but also that if welfare 
recipients are forced to work for wages, then their economic well-
being will be enhanced significantly as illustrated by "successful" 
welfare-to-work programs as implemented by states such as Califor-
nia. Part IV analyzes both the Consensus' desire to modify the be"" 
havior of welfare recipients and Rank's claims that such a desire is 
unwarranted because, contrary to popular belief, the poor are no 
different from the non-poor. Finally, it concludes with some 
thoughts about the stigma of negritude and its impact on the appar-
ent "logic" of the Consensus, its assumptions and its proposed wel-
fare reforms. 
I. MORALITY, LAW, AND WELFARE 
Social welfare policy arises at the intersection of morality with 
law and policy - the point at which both Handler and Rank center 
NATION (1995); ELLIOT LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER! A, STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER 
MEN (1967). 
18. Rank asserts that "the common stereotypes surrounding welfare" support the belief 
that "most recipients are minorit[y women who are] on welfare ... for long periods oftime 
[who] have more children to get higher welfare payments." Rank, p. 142; see also Rank, p. 2 
(describing the stereotypical welfare recipient as a "good-for-nothing freeloader who drives a 
Cadillac, uses Food Stamps to buy sirloin steak, or watches soap operas all day"). 
19. They define the mainstream according to their shared view of the debate about wel-
fare reform - that is, as occurring in the largely partisan and ideological universe occupied 
by liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans. I concur with this definition because it 
excludes radical outliers. Cf. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING PooR: FROM THE w AR 
ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 79-123 (1989) (discussing the debate about welfare 
in terms that include radicals); Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference 
in Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 999, 1020-25 (1994) (discussing poverty 
lawyers and their lawyering in terms of liberal legalists, radicals, and critics); Lisa A. Crooms, 
Stepping into the Projects: Lawmaking, Storytelling and Practicing the Politics of Identifica-
tion, 1 MICH. J. RAcE & L. 1 (1996) (defining the mainstream in terms that, while not synony-
mous with white, recognize the central role of the ideology of white supremacy to the 
mainstream's principles). 
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their analyses of the current mainstream. welfare-reform debate.20 
Focusing on the AFDC21 program, Handler characterizes the main-
stream's proposals to reform the program as a series of "right-flank-
ing" moves by political liberals and conservatives at both the 
national and the state level out of which emerged bipartisan con-
sensus.22 Both authors recognize the public ambivalence towards 
AFDC, an ambivalence that reflects the perceived immorality of 
AFDC recipients and their apparent unwillingness to abide by the 
social norms of mainstream life (Handler, pp. 90-94). This ambiva-
lence leads to policy initiatives designed to make individuals more 
responsible but that pay little attention to the structural forces that 
prevent the poor from escaping poverty.23 
Handler predicts that the current round of reforms, the latest 
installment in an ongoing struggle, will meet a fate no different 
from that of its misguided and ill-conceived predecessors (Handler, 
p. 112). The mainstream's discourse reiterates the same themes, is-
sues, and choices raised over the centuries as societies have consid-
ered their obligations to care for those members unable to provide 
for their own needs.24 In most instances the resolution of this issue 
becomes inextricably linked to morality as societies seek to uphold 
the obligation of each man to support himself and his family. This 
20. As Handler notes, "although contemporary welfare policies are often described in 
so-called objective terms - labor markets, wage rates, incentives, demographics - they are 
heavily laden with moral judgments." Handler, p. 30. 
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1988). AFDC is "a $23 billion federal-state program support-
ing 14.5 million people, 9.5 million of them children. It is supplemented by food stamps, 
public housing, child care and nutrition programs." Washington Can't Wash Its Hands of 
Welfare, USA ToDAY, Aug. l, 1995, at lOA. 
22. See Handler, p. 3. Despite the intense bi-partisanship on the surface of the main-
stream's discourse, members of both parties have recognized the consensus to which Handler 
refers. See Pamela M. Prah, Clinton Vetoes Welfare Package; Lawmakers Look to 1996 to Try 
Again, Daily Labor Report (BNA) 7 (Jan. 11, 1996) (reporting Republican criticism of Clin-
ton as "a typical Democrat, a very liberal protector of the nation's failed welfare system"); 
Welfare Farewell, THE NATION, 809, 811-12 (1995) (detailing current partisan wrangling over 
congressional welfare reform proposals). For example, President Clinton recently acknowl-
edged the Consensus when he stated, "Congress and I are near agreement on sweeping wel-
fare reform. We agree on time limits, tough work requirements and the toughest possible 
child-support enforcement." Clinton, supra note 1. Michigan Governor John Engler, one of 
the most visible Republicans at the forefront of welfare reform, now supports Clinton's pro-
posals to provide to "poor people services like child care and transportation while requiring 
them to work." Jason DeParle,Aidfrom an Enemy of the Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
1996, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4. To many, the Consensus is lamentable. Handler, for one, 
decries the dawn of the "new" Democrat Handler, pp. 37-38; see, e.g., Dirk Johnson, With 
Popular Issues, Clinton Strikes Chord, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A18 (quoting Michael 
Bellows, a social worker from Chicago, expressing his concern that "Clinton no longer repre-
sents true Democratic ideology ..• [b]ut for liberals like me, he's all we've got"). 
23. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 9. 
24. Handler marks the passage of England's Statute of Labourers in 1349 as the begin-
ning of social security. See Handler, chapter 1. Rank marks it with the Elizabethan Poor 
Law of 1601 which was the start of outdoor, that is, not institutionalized, relief. See Rank, 
chapter 2. 
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link has grown especially strong in the United States, where "the 
notion that there are no socioeconomic systemic flaws that produce 
poverty" is "[f]undamental to our cultural order."25 Indeed, the 
"enthusiastic[ ] celebrat[ion of] ... the Horatio Algers, the Abra-
ham Lincolns, or the Clarence Thomases of this country" seems 
crucial to maintaining our collective faith in "the American dream 
... of opportunity" (Rank, pp. 200-01). In this context "individual 
flaws merely produce the appearance of system failure," and people 
become scapegoats for conditions and circumstances largely beyond 
their control.26 Those who do not succeed are thought to deserve 
the punitive measures designed to make them conform (Rank, p. 
171). Their apparent immorality permits policy makers to propose 
draconian and arguably illegal measures in the name of reforming 
their "deviant" and intolerable ways. Handler observes, however, 
that despite these efforts to reform welfare, "for the vast majority 
of [AFDC recipients] life will go on much as before, unless dra-
matic changes take place in America's labor markets and the larger 
environment."27 
II. HANDLER'S CONSENSUS AND THE "CULTURE OF POVERTY" 
Handler's work confronts four "key assumptions" about the na-
ture of poverty and its cures: (1) welfare dependency is a moral 
issue; (2) welfare destroys the work ethic; (3) welfare should modify 
individual behavior to comport with mainstream norms; and ( 4) re-
form efforts should be directed at adults (Handler, p. 4). For Han-
dler, these assumptions best capture the apparent "logic" of the 
Consensus position as well as its false dichotomy between work and 
welfare.2s The Consensus not" only frames the issue as one of wel-
fare versus work but also diagnoses a "culture of poverty" that 
drives the poor.29 
25. Larry Cata Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: The Futility of "Ending Welfare as 
We Know It," 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 339, 341 (1995); see also Rank, p. 200. 
26. Backer, supra note 25, at 341. 
27. Handler, p. 112; see also Rothman, supra note 9. 
28. Chapter 3 of Handler's book specifically addresses the problems associated with the 
false dichotomy between welfare and work. 
29. Oscar Lewis developed the culture-of-poverty thesis in a series of works based on the 
experiences of poor Puerto Ricans. This thesis carried with it radical implications because 
Lewis called for efforts to organize poor Latinos to overcome the mindset that they devel-
oped as a coping mechanism for seemingly inevitable poverty. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 19, 
at 16-19. In the 1960s, social conservatives misappropriated Lewis's explanation of poverty 
and adapted it to their agenda. Lewis's theory allowed them to blame the poor for their 
pathology of poverty. See id. at 19-35; cf. Rank, p. 175. Lewis apparently appreciated the 
potential for such misappropriation. He warned "that my findings might be misinterpreted 
or used to justify prejudices and negative stereotypes .•• which, unfortunately, are still held 
by some Americans." KATZ, supra note 19, at 19 (quoting OsCAR LEWIS, LAV10A: A Pu-
ERTo RICAN FAMILY IN TifE CuLTURE OF POVERTY - SAN JUAN AND NEW YORK xiii 
(1966)). 
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The culture-of-poverty theory, which preoccupies the current 
mainstream discourse, views the black ghetto underclass as the met-
aphor for all the problems of welfare. Specifically, the image of the 
black single mother living in a devastated inner-city community 
:figures prominently in the mainstream welfare reform discourse.3o 
As Rank comments, "Welfare dependency is viewed as part of a 
cultural process in which children learn from their parents and from 
their surrounding environment that relying on welfare, bearing chil-
dren out of wedlock, dropping out of school, and so on, are accepta-
ble behaviors" (Rank, p. 175). Relying heavily on this theory, the 
Consensus appears to blame the mere receipt of AFDC benefits for 
crime, juvenile delinquency, substance abuse, AIDS, and the other 
social ills most common to underclass communities.31 Such imagery 
makes the explicit identification of the race of the poor unneces-
sary; poverty in its most heinous form is presumptively black 
(Handler, pp. 3-4). 
Both Handler and Rank criticize the bipartisan Consensus for 
its failure to frame the issue correctly. As Handler sees it, the 
problems of underclass communities follow from poverty rather 
than welfare. ·In his view, the eradication of poverty requires more 
than.human capital development and equal opportunity; an expla-
nation of poverty must go beyond individual irresponsibility and 
moral failure.32 Rather, that explanation requires an understanding 
of what Rank calls "structural vulnerability" (Rank, p. 180). Struc-
tural vulnerability measures the structural impact of both human 
capital deficiencies and irrational market barriers, such as discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender, on the class mobility of the least ad-
vantaged members of society.33 It seeks to avoid the problems 
associated with other theories that ignore "the important influence 
of larger factors that lie beyond people's immediate control[, with-
out] suggest[ing] that individual characteristics are irrelevant" 
(Rank, p. 171 ). As Rank explains, individual characteristics are 
"simply best understood within a wider context" (Rank, p. 171). 
30. Handler, pp. 35-36; see also Rank, pp. 27-30 (discussing the cultural explanations of 
poverty embraced by Daniel Patrick Moynihan and William Julius Wilson in which inner·city 
black communities are central). 
31. Handler, p. 3; see generally Rank, pp. 58·61 (describing the physical consequences of 
poverty such as disease, crime, and acute health problems). 
32. As Ruth Margaret Buchanan observes, the "debate over whether poor people are 
lazy and immoral or merely lack social opportunities is an example of how complex social 
dilemmas are misleadingly reduced to a simple question of structural versus individual re-
sponsibility." Buchanan, supra note 19, at 1008. In chapter 3, Handler argues that the prob-
lem is not one of welfare versus work but one of poverty which persists even for those who 
work. He concludes that the focus on welfare is misguided and that instead we must explore 
what prevents some workers from earning a living wage. Handler, pp. 39-44. 
33. Rank, pp. 176-85. Like Rank's structural vulnerability theory, Handler's analysis of 
poverty identifies both structural problems and human capital deficiencies as significant. 
Handler, pp. 35-39. 
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Handler views poverty and welfare dependency as outcomes of 
the deterioration of family income ·between 1973 and 1990 
(Handler, pp. 34-35). He explains how this deterioration has led to 
an increase in the numbers of both multiple job holders and work-
ing household members, all of whom strive to support a family.34 
He describes how it has affected family structure by increasing the 
number of households headed by women who hold the primary re-
sponsibility for the financial support of their families.35 Conse-
quently, more women have entered the labor market, which is 
hampered by irrational barriers such as gender discrimination.36 
Indeed, "[m]ost women are ... still segregated in low-paying, tradi-
tionally female jobs in clerical, sales and service occupations."37 As 
such, factors beyond their control severely limit their earning po-
tential. That is, "low wages are linked to the skills and jobs that 
women usually hold."38 Although low income does not determine 
family behavior, poverty has proven the "most powerful predictor 
of ... harmful behavioral consequences" (Handler, p. 36). This ex-
plains why female-headed families disproportionately fill the ranks 
of the poor and play a crucial role in the rhetoric of welfare reform. 
III. WORK VERSUS WELFARE ' 
Handler concerns himself primarily with the link between 
waged work and welfare in the current mainstream social welfare 
discourse. He concludes that neither mandatory waged work pro-
posals nor time-limited benefits will succeed for the simple reason 
that they fail to address the causes of poverty. According to 
Handler, this society can remedy poverty only by creating jobs that 
34. Handler, p. 35; see also Rank, pp. 43-44 (describing the conditions that lead married 
couples to welfare); FAMIUES & WORK INST., WOMEN: THE NEW PROVIDERS 31 (1995) (ob-
serving that, although "the notion persists that women's wages are only supplementary and 
provide discretionary income ... the economic viability of many households is dependent on 
women's earnings"). 
35. Handler, p. 35; see also Rank, pp. 42-43, 79 (discussing the effects of poverty on fam-
ily structures and the strains poverty puts on marriages, many of which dissolve). 
36. See Handler, p. 35; Rank, pp. 42-43; Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the 
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989); Mary E. Becker, 
Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual 
Disadvantages in Employment, 19 GEo. LJ. 1659, 1659 (1991) (discussing sex discrimination 
in employment and gender-based wage differentials as "one aspect of the systemic subordina-
tion of women and people of color to whites and men, particularly white men, under rules, 
practices and standards made by white men and preserving their power"). See generally 
Barbara Crossette, U.N. Documents Inequities for Women as World Forum Nears, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at A3 (noting that despite the halving of "gender gaps in human capa-
bilities" over the last 20 years, "women overwhelmingly still lack access to economic and 
political opportunities"); Rothman, supra note 9 (discussing poverty in the context of factors 
such as discrimination). 
37. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WORKING WOMEN CouNT!: A REPORT 
TO THE NATION 23 (1994). 
38. Id. 
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pay living wages.39 Until it does so, public assistance will remain a 
necessity.40 
As Handler notes, to assume that AFDC recipients do not work 
for wages presupposes that AFDC pays recipients enough to meet 
their basic needs. This, however, ignores the fact that the program 
exists to reduce the misery associated with poverty rather than to 
remedy it.41 As Rank observes: 
[p ]erhaps most apparent when one listens to welfare recipients de-
scribe their daily lives and routines is the constant economic struggle 
that they face. This includes difficulties paying monthly bills, not hav-
ing enough food, worrying about health care costs, and so on. The 
amount of income received each month is simply insufficient to cover 
all these necessary expenses.42 
This struggle presents a significant dilemma for AFDC recipients. 
On the one hand, if they work and report their income, their AFDC 
checks will shrink. Reporting thus defeats the purpose of working 
- that is, to increase the amount of money with which to meet the 
family's basic needs.43 As Kelly McGrath explained, 
There's people that [work] and get paid cash and don't report it. And 
they probably don't report that their family members are helping 'em. 
They wouldn't say, "Yeah my mom gave me a hundred dollars last 
month." I mean they just wouldn't do that because it's hard enough 
39. Any program to move people off of public assistance must create jobs. Unfortu-
nately, those with only a high school diploma face dim prospects. According to a recent 
study by the MacArthur Foundation, an estimated 140,000 jobs will be available in the Chi-
cago area in the next ten years. One-half of those jobs will require a high school education 
but will not pay a living wage. See Thomas Geoghegan, The State of the Worker, N.Y. T1MES, 
Jan. 25, 1996, at A21. 
40. Although Handler makes some passing comments about the possibility of reconcep-
tualizing work to include domestic caretaking, he apparently rejects this idea. See Handler, 
pp. 32-33. At least one of Rank's interviewees appeared to support the idea of domestic 
caretaking as an economically valuable activity when she noted: 
I mean if you got a family, what're you talkin' about lazy?! A woman is on [welfare] 
because she's got some children. And if she's at home and she's doin' for her family, 
how the hell is she lazy? ... [T]o me that's not laziness. If she's doing a good job at that 
•.. that's not laziness! 
Rank, pp. 122-23. 
41. Susan Mayer & Christopher Jencks, War on Poverty: No Apologies, Please, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at A29. 
42. Rank, p. 51; see also Kathryn Edin & Christopher Jencks, Reforming Welfare, in RE-
THINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 204 (Christopher Jencks 
ed., 1992). 
The story of Mary Summers, a fifty-one-year-old divorced mother of two teenage daugh· 
ters, makes these difficulties all too real. Summers 
receives $544 a month from AFDC and $106 a month [in] Food Stamps. After paying 
$280 for rent (which includes heat and electricity), she and her [two] daughters are left 
with $370 a month (including Food Stamps) to live on. This comes to approximately $12 
a day, or $4 per family member. 
Rank, p. 52. Summers does not receive AFDC because she prefers welfare to wages; rather, 
"she ha[s] been unable to find work for two years." Rank, p. 52; see also Rank, pp. 54-56 
(describing how recipients make ends meet). 
43. Edin & Jencks, supra note 42, at 204. 
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to survive on the aid. When you get extra, you don't want 'em to take 
it away from you. And that's what they do.44 
On the other hand, if they work and do not report their income, 
they increase their ability to make ends meet, albeit at a level below 
the poverty line. Therefore, "[t]he only way most welfare recipients 
can make ends meet ... is to supplement their welfare checks with-
out telling the department."45 That is, they must "lie and cheat in 
order to survive. "46 
Moreover, most of the poor occupy the position esteemed by 
the mainstream - that is, they work and do not receive AFDC. 
What the mainstream does not see, at least in the context of welfare 
reform, is that millions of working people cannot lift themselves out 
of poverty. As Handler notes, in 1993, the 13.6 million welfare re-
cipients accounted for only about one-third of those living in pov-
erty (Handler, p. 34). Thus, even if the coming reforms achieve 
their stated objectives and move all AFDC recipients from welfare 
to work, there is little likelihood that these workers will earn 
enough to meet their basic needs. As Handler notes, "the real 
earnings of the less-skilled, less-educated workers have declined 
substantially since 1973," and the numbers of working poor people 
have increased in step (Handler, pp. 39-40). He asks, "if the prob-
lem is welfare and the vast majority of the poor are working and 
not on welfare, then what is the problem of work?" (Handler, p. 
39). Forced off welfare and into the low-waged jobs for which they 
qualify, AFDC recipients will confront that "problem of work." 
Clearly, "requiring welfare recipients to work ... does little to im-
prove their economic well-being," and the mainstream's reform 
proposals do little to address the phenomenon (Handler, p. 88). 
Finally, as Handler observes, the mainstream political rhetoric 
seems inconsistent: it advocates both cutting costs as well as the 
need to provide AFDC recipients with the resources necessary to 
put them on the path to economic independence.47 Rather than 
address the real financial requirements of the capital-intensive pro-
grams needed to remedy the varied and interlocking causes of pov-
erty, Handler contends that the Consensus exaggerates the 
44. Rank, p. 119. Ironically, the mainstream fails to recognize that this activity comports 
with family values. Recipients who rely on relatives often come from close families that 
"take care of each other if anybody has a problem." Rank, pp. 70-71. 
45. Edin & Jencks, supra note 42, at 204; see also Rank, pp. 169-70 (noting that in spite of 
the impact of low-waged work on the level of family income, "many on welfare work or 
eventually will find work"). 
46. Edin & Jencks, supra note 42, at 205. 
47. See DeParle, supra note 22 (noting that "[w]ork programs almost always cost more 
than sending checks," and that "the financing of the Republicans' ••• bill is sufficiently short 
that fewer than 15 states will meet their employment goals"); Rothman, supra note 9 ( charac-
terizing work programs as "invariably more expensive than simply providing welfare pay-
ments" and "counter to the ••. aim of creating cheap labor"). 
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moderate success of state demonstration projects and wishes to 
limit the role of the federal government to encourage more state 
experimentation.4s 
To underscore this claim, Handler lays out the Consensus' views 
about the success of California's Greater Avenues to Indepen-
dence, or "GAIN," program: 
[T]he basic idea [behind GAIN] is that all eligible recipients are to 
participate in programs until they become employed or are off 
AFDC. Mothers whose children are three years or older are eligi-
ble .... Recipients undergo orientation and appraisal before they are 
slotted. Those with work experience, for example, go immediately 
into job search. Others might go to remedial education. Employment 
plans are developed for those unable to find jobs, and work-for-relief 
is provided for those who complete the plan but fail to find a job 
within ninety days. Work-for-relief can last up to a year, and then the 
process begins again.49 
The localized administration of GAIN leads to uneven results 
across counties. As Handler notes, "because GAIN depends on an 
extensive network of county services and counties vary in the avail-
ability of these services and the willingness and ability of the serv-
ices to cooperate with welfare departments, there is wide variation 
in the operation of the program" (Handler, p. 67). Handler con-
cludes that misconceptions about the performance of the GAIN 
program in one California county guide much of the rhetoric about 
the potential of mandatory work programs. 
To prove his point, Handler analyzed Manpower Development 
Research Corporation (MDRC) data regarding the program's per-
formance in Riverside, Alameda, and Los Angeles counties. River-
side County, with both rural and urban areas, had a high percentage 
of AFDC recipients who were minorities without basic education 
(Handler, p. 68). The Riverside program stressed employment and 
an inexpensive job search based on a philosophy that "a low-paying 
entry-level job was better than no job at all and could lead to a 
better job" (Handler, p. 68). In Alameda County a large propor-
tion of long-term AFDC recipients were African-American inner-
city residents, many of whom also lacked a basic education. Ala-
meda's program, however, emphasized "basic education and train-
48. As of August 1995, the Clinton administration had "approved 36 demonstrations in 
32 states ••. 23 states require work, 17 limit benefits, 27 have increased earned income 
AFDC recipients can keep, 14 have strengthened child.support enforcement and 25 stress 
parental responsibility." Washington, supra note 21; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988) (per-
mitting the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive certain requirements and thus 
to allow states to experiment with novel welfare programs); Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that§ 1315(a) waivers for welfare experiments are subject to judicial 
review). 
49. Handler, pp. 65-66; see also Ann VanDePol & Katherine E. Meiss, California's 
GAIN: Greater Avenues or a Narrow Path? The Politics and Policies of Welfare Reform and 
AFDC Work Programs in the 1980s, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 49, 69 (1987). 
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ing to prepare recipients for higher-paying jobs" (Handler, p. 68). 
Finally, Los Angeles County held one-third of California's welfare 
recipients, including a large inner-city, long-term AFDC popula-
tion. It also contained both the highest percentages of non-English 
speakers and minorities and the lowest percentage of recipients 
with recent work experience. Its program enrolled only those "in 
need of basic education" (Handler, p. 68). 
Having discussed the demographics of the three counties as well 
as the differences between their GAIN programs, Handler com-
pares the performance of the Riverside County program with that 
of the programs in Alameda and Los Angeles counties. He then 
examines the performance of Riverside County in terms of its effect 
on the earnings of program participants. In so doing, Handler ex-
poses the error of relying on the Riverside County experience as 
"the standard-bearer or model ... for proposed [national] changes" 
(Handler, p. 67). 
As the MDRC data demonstrate, the Riverside County pro-
gram outperformed the Alameda and Los Angeles County pro-
grams in terms of net cost,50 benefit-cost ratios51 and earnings 
effect.52 But, as MDRC cautioned, the different results across 
counties suggest that different counties must implement different 
combinations of strategies. Many social welfare policy pundits, 
however, appear unwilling to heed MDRC's advice. Instead, they 
talk as if "the Riverside program could be replicated elsewhere" 
(Handler, p. 75). They ignore the fact that Florida tried unsuccess-
fully to implement the Riverside approach statewide in 1987.53 
Without an appreciation for the importance of local particularities 
to program success, federal welfare reform will fail much as Florida 
did in 1987. 
Even if other states and counties could replicate the Riverside 
County program, the MDRC notes that GAIN "was only moder-
ately successful in moving people off welfare and out of poverty by 
the end of three years" (Handler, p. 75). As for the earnings effect, 
50. The five-year average net cost was less than $2000 per recipient in Riverside and 
more than $5500 in both Alameda and Los Angeles counties. The difference reflected, in 
large part, the relatively large numbers of long-term recipients in Alameda and Los Angeles 
counties engaged in education and job-training programs. See Handler, p. 70. 
51. While Riverside County experienced a gain of $2.84 for each $1 illvested, both Ala-
meda and Los Angeles counties experienced losses. See Handler, p. 70. 
52. The MDRC data indicate that five of the six counties that participated in the GAIN 
program experienced an average income effect of $923 per experimental subject over a five-
year period. Riverside County recipients gained the most - $1900 - while Los Angeles 
County recipients suffered an average net loss of $1561 over the same period. See Handler, 
p. 73. 
53. This is not meant to suggest that particular jurisdictions cannot replicate the Riverside 
program. Indeed, it appears that in another county with demographics similar to those of 
Riverside County, the program might enjoy the same moderate success. 
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Riverside County participants increased their income by an average 
of $3113 for three years, or approximately $1037 each year 
(Handler, p. 69). Thus, their earnings increased an average of $84 
per month, or less than $20 per week.s4 Handler interprets the 
small earnings effect as evidence of the control group's work activi-
ties (Handler, p. 70). This conclusion, however, follows only if the 
control group's reported income included employment income - a 
highly unlikely condition. Indeed, the Edin and Jencks study on 
which Handler relies argues that neither the earned income of 
AFDC recipients nor their employment factor into mainstream so-
cial welfare discourse because the vast majority of recipients do not 
report their additional income.ss This flaw, however, does not 
prove fatal to Handler's analysis. The point remains: the hype 
about programs such as the Riverside County program finds little 
support in their actual performance.s6 Ironically, as Handler notes, 
the real experiences under GAIN, excluding Riverside County, re-
semble those under the current federal JOBS program that the 
Consensus has declared an abysmal failure.s1 
IV. BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, SAMENESS/DIFFERENCE, 
AND POWER 
In the context of measures designed to modify the behavior of 
individual AFDC recipients, the Consensus focuses again on state 
experiments, but its more conservative members do so in order to 
justify the federal conditions they wish to place on block grants to 
the states.ss Their commitment to such an authoritarian agenda be-
trays their pledge to end big government and highlights their inten-
tion that the federal government control the social behavior of 
AFDC recipients. 
54. See Handler, p. 69. After the reduction in AFDC benefits resulting from recipients' 
increased earnings, the earnings effect of the program decreases to an average of $52 per 
month. See Handler, pp. 69-70. 
55. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
56. See Handler, pp. 67-85; see also VanDePol & Meiss, supra note 49, at 80-82 (criticiz-
ing GAIN as doing little more than pushing AFDC recipients into low-wage jobs and as not 
increasing their financial resources for their families' basic needs). 
57. See Handler, p. 76; see also Mayer & Jencks, supra note 41, at A29 (noting that 
"[m]illions of Americans, including a majority of legislators," believe that social programs do 
not work). 
58. See Handler, pp. 133-35. Both Democrats and Republicans have opposed the strings 
attached to block grants under the House of Representative's Personal Responsibility Act. 
Democrats, who oppose block grants, tend to favor increased state and local control through 
a streamlined version of the current Department of Health and Human Services waiver pro-
cess. Republicans, especially at the state and local level, support block grants "with virtually 
no strings attached." See, e.g., DeParle, supra note 22; see also Herbert, supra note 8, at A17 
{"The fundamental principle that our national Government is the protector of last resort is 
what is at stake as we give .•. block grants to the states and tell them to go ahead and do 
whatever they want." (quoting Marian Wright Edelman)). . 
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The experiences of the Wisconsin welfare recipients interviewed 
for Rank's book, from applying for welfare to leaving the rolls, pro-
vides additional evidence that the Consensus' current reform pro-
posals are misguided and sure to fail. Rank makes clear that the 
Consensus' prototype does not represent the entire recipient popu-
lation but only a small percentage of it.59 Accordingly, he views the 
potential damage from the current reforms as associated with their 
overbreadth. The Consensus tailored its current reforms after this 
prototype, which represents very few actual welfare recipients. In 
Rank's opinion the Consensus should not treat the rest of them like 
the black, inner-city single mothers with whom it appears most 
concerned. 
Rank's strategy focuses on the "sameness" of the poor. He 
seems to believe that this approach de-emphasizes the alleged devi-
ance and difference of the poor and underscores the structural vul-
nerability their poverty represents (Rank, pp. 180-81). He 
encourages his readers to empathize with public assistance recipi-
ents, in the hope that such empathy will reveal the arbitrariness of 
this perceived difference. 
Unfortunately, Rank's chosen paradigm impairs his ability to 
evaluate the potential injury of the proposed reforms in a way that 
strengthens the universality of his structural vulnerability theory. 
His focus on difference and sameness obscures the questions of 
power raised by issues of poverty.60 Conceding, as Rank does, that 
poverty is largely a structural phenomenon requires an analysis be-
yond the sameness of the poor and Rank's audience. 
Professor Catharine MacKinnon's dominance approach may 
provide a better paradigm for this project. In her essay Difference 
and Dominance: - On Sex Discrimination, 61 Professor MacKinnon 
criticizes mainstream feminists who embrace the sameness-differ-
ence paradigm to analyze questions of sex equality. According to 
59. See Rank, p. 49; see also Handler, p. 34. 
60. Professor Patricia Williams similarly criticizes the politics of the recent Million Man 
March held in Washington D.C. She viewed the event as a time for Black men to insist, 
" 'We exist!' 'We are different!' and 'We are good!' " Patricia J. Williams, The Million Man 
Atonement: Different Drummer Please, Marchers!, 261 THE NATION, 493, 494 (1995). She 
contends that such expressions incorrectly frame the issue and fail to recognize the problems 
of stereotypes that seem to make "atonement" the private domain of Black men. See id. 
Williams envisions a realigned and inclusive day of atonement in which 
Bob Packwood could join, marching side by side with Ben Chavis, both apologizing up a 
storm[.] Where Rush Limbaugh and Mark Fuhrman could weep for their sins with 
Marion Barry; where Pat Buchanan and Louis Farrakhan could jump up shouting with 
the ecumenical power of divine redemption. In which Clinton came down from his 
mount and atoned for Lani Guinier, while Jesse Helms climbed up out of his burrow and 
let Clinton appoint her to the Justice Department. In which Charles Murray and Dinesh 
D'Souza confronted the Black Child Within and had transformational experiences. 
Id. 
61. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNoN, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 (1987). 
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MacKinnon, "[a]pproaching sex discrimination ... as if sex ques-
tions are difference questions and equality questions are sameness 
questions ... provides two ways ... to hold women to a male stan-
dard and call that sex equality."62 She argues that such an approach 
leads to the perception that "demands for [sex] equality [ask] to 
have it both ways: the same when we are the same, different when 
we are different."63 In employment, for example, many feminists 
advocate a gender and sex neutrality that entitles those women who 
can conform to the male norm of full-time employment to equality 
of opportunity.64 Accordingly, they de-emphasize those things that 
make women different from men such as child bearing and child 
rearing because these differences may justify differential treat-
ment.65 Other feminists, however, focus on those sex and gender 
differences and seek to have them accommodated in the workplace 
through measures such as maternity leave and pregnancy benefits.66 
MacKinnon advocates "an alternative approach" in which "[sex] 
equality . . . is a question of the distribution of power" and 
"[g]ender is ... a question of power, specifically of male supremacy 
and female subordination."67 Rather than avoid confronting the 
presumed legitimacy of the status quo, as the sameness/difference 
approach does, MacKinnon's "dominance approach ... is critical of 
reality."68 Therefore, it criticizes feminists on both sides of the 
sameness-difference divide. To those obsessed with sameness, 
MacKinnon says we must abandon gender neutrality because it 
"has mostly gotten men the benefit of those few things women have 
historically had."69 She asks "[w]hy should you have to be the same 
as a man to get what a man gets simply because he is one?"70 She 
warns those who celebrate difference not to "affirm[ ] what we have 
been, which necessarily is what we have been permitted, as if it is 
women's, ours, possessive."71 To MacKinnon, these feminists make 
"it seem as though [female] attributes, with their consequences, re-
62. Id. at 34. MacKinnon notes that questions of sameness and difference, in this context, 
carry with them a male referent This establishes maleness as the norm and fails to appreci-
ate that women are as different from men as men are different from women. See id. at 37. 
63. Id. at 39. 
64. See id. at 37; see also Abrams, supra note 36, at 1220-26. 
65. See MACKINNON, supra note 61, at 34-36. 
66. See id. at 34-36, 242 n.18. 
67. Id. at 40. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 35. For example, the law of custody and divorce has been transformed by gen-
der neutrality so that "men (have] an equal chance at custody of children and at alimony." 
Id. 
70. Id. at 37. 
71. Id. at 39. 
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ally are somehow ours, rather than what male supremacy has attrib-
uted to us for its own use."72 
Rank's sameness-difference paradigm suffers from flaws similar 
to those of the feminist sameness-difference paradigm. By focusing 
on sameness to dispel myths of difference, Rank obscures the na-
ture of the entitlement at issue. Will the problems commonly 
thought to be associated with welfare dependency be remedied if all 
AFDC recipients work for wages? In Rank's own estimation the 
answer is "no": the structural vulnerability of the recipient popula-
tion will place them in the same position occupied by the working 
poor who do not rely on AFDC. The work experiences of his inter-
viewees support this conclusion.73 
Rather than be viewed as an issue of sameness or difference, 
poverty may more appropriately be conceptualized as an issue of 
power and its distribution. As such, we should assess any proposed 
remedy based on its impact on the power disparity between the 
poor and the wealthy.74 MacKinnon's "dominance approach," with 
its focus on power disparities and abuses, may help clarify a more 
promising poverty policy than one based on similarities between 
the poor and the nonpoor. Also, a power-based analysis may prove 
more compatible with Rank's theory of structural vulnerability than 
one based on the sameness-difference paradigm, as Rank's theory 
72. Id. Although MacKinnon's approach may prove better suited to Rank's articulated 
task, I want to make clear that I have reservations about her approach, all of which stem 
from the limited nature of her analysis as it relates to discrimination suffered by black women 
and her overly optimistic view of the Jaw's treatment of race. First, MacKinnon has been 
criticized, and rightfully so, for her tendency to resort to essentialism. See Angela P. Harris, 
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990). Second, 
MacKinnon claims that courts during the sixties implicitly applied a dominance model to 
questions of racial justice. She bases this claim on Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in 
which the Supreme Court struck down Virginia's anti-mis~genation statute as a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See MACKINNON, supra note 61, at 42 n.35. MacKinnon reads 
that decision as "based on the realization that the condition of Blacks ... was not fundamen-
tally a matter of rational or irrational differentiation on the basis of race but was fundamen-
tally a matter of white supremacy, under which racial differences became invidious as a 
consequence." Id. at 42. Although Loving characterized the Virginia statute as "designed to 
maintain White supremacy," the Court had a limited vision of both this supremacy and its 
manifestations. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. It embraced race neutrality as the proper remedy 
and failed to recognize the institutionalized and systemic nature of white supremacy and its 
accompanying oppression. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the In-
tersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 162, 173-75 (1994). Finally, MacKinnon claims that the abolition of slavery meant that 
"no amount of group difference mattered anymore." MACKINNON, supra note 61, at 44. 
Such a conclusion seems ahistorical, and ignores the significance of cases such as Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1898), as well as the black codes or Jim Crow Jaws that included the 
very statute struck down in Loving. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SA VEO: 
THE ELUSIVE QuEST FoR RACIAL JUSTICE 169 (1987) (discussing the Supreme Court's ap-
parent unwillingness to consider constitutional challenges to state anti-miscegenation statutes 
before its decision in Loving). 
73. See Rank, pp. 114-25. 
74. Such an approach has the potential to build alliances based on a shared interest of 
poor and non-poor to redistribute power more equitably. 
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treats poverty as the result of a convergence of different institution-
alized oppressions.75 
Rank's sameness-difference analysis allows for highly punitive 
measures for recipients who resemble the discourse's prototype. 
Indeed, he seems to concede that vindictive proposals may be justi-
fied for the small percentage of the recipient population that is 
poor, black, single, urban-dwelling, and female.76 According to 
Rank, 
[t]hose who posit cultural reasons for welfare dependency ... are gen-
erally referring to severely depressed inner-city areas .... Had I fo-
cused exclusively upon the inner city, it is certainly possible that I 
might have found more evidence of the importance of cultural factors. 
Regardless, . . . those living in major metropolitan inner-city areas 
constitute a very small percentage of the overall poverty population. 
They are simply not representative of most people who are poor and on 
welfare. [Rank, p. 175; emphasis added] 
Therefore, Rank apparently sees the injury flowing from the main-
stream's current reforms as caused by the overinclusiveness of the 
punitive measures rather than from the socially constructed mean-
ing of the debate. He decries the apparent willingness of the gen-
eral public to assume that the discourse's prototype represents all 
welfare recipients. 
Finally, he introduces the voices of AFDC recipients in terms 
that segregate them from the mainstream. As Rank notes, no one 
believes the current AFDC program works: "Conservatives worry 
that it erodes the work ethic, retards productivity, and rewards the 
lazy. Liberals view [it] as incomplete, inadequate, and punitive. 
Poor people, who rely on it, find it degrading, demoralizing, and 
mean."77 In Rank's world, the poor are neither liberal nor con-
servative, and neither liberals nor conservatives are poor. Rank 
draws unnecessary distinctions between the poor and the nonpoor 
in a way that duplicates the historic need for line drawing in social 
welfare policy.78 Moreover, his data do not support this division: 
the recipients he interviewed spanned the ideological spectrum. 
While Chester Peterson echoes the views of the Consensus and be-
lieves that AFDC encourages welfare mothers to bear children 
(Rank, pp. 142-43), Denise Turner believes that mothers who 
75. Recognizing the multiplicity of factors at work requires a multi-axes analysis such as 
that advocated by scholars under the rubric of intersectional analysis. See, e.g., Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 
139. 
76. See Rank, p. 4. 
77. Rank, p. 12 (quoting MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN TIIE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE! A 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA ix (1986)). 
78. See Rank, pp. 13-25; see also Handler, pp. 10-31 (reviewing the historical develop· 
ment of welfare policy). 
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choose to stay at home and care for their children deserve assist-
ance (Rank, pp. 122-23). 
Unfortunately, Rank's effort to dispel the myths underlying the 
current debate falls prey to one of liberalism's contributions to the 
debate's moral tone. That is, it adopts the idea of individual re-
sponsibility that, in turn, supports the notion that a welfare recipi-
ent might deserve the punitive measures proposed by social welfare 
policymakers under some circumstances. 
V. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF THE STIGMA OF NEGRITUDE 
The significance of race and its accompanying social constructs 
may help to answer Handler's and Rank's questions.79 The appar-
ent logic of the rhetoric employed in the mainstream's discourse 
may be, in large part, a function of race and the role it played in the 
War on Poverty. More specifically, the post-1964 policy of the 
Johnson administration sought to respond to the demands of the 
movements for civil rights and black liberation.80 The Wat on Pov-
erty shifted from the primarily white, rural, and passive poverty that 
caught the attention of the Kennedy administration to the primarily 
black, urban, and aggressive poverty represented by urban rebel-
lions such as the Watts uprisings in 1965.81 Poverty became a black 
issue in the context of a civil-rights agenda conceptualized in largely 
middle-class terms and a black liberation agenda firmly committed 
to the perpetuation of the patriarchy.82 The country's discomfort 
with racial issues, many of which remain unresolved, helped to cre-
ate the "us-versus-them" paradigm in which "us" denotes normalcy 
while "them" indicates deviance. Blackness became a proxy for 
poverty and justified the stigma that attached to those who needed 
public assistance. The explicit link between blackness and social 
welfare policy means that the stigma historically associated with 
79. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
80. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 140 (characterizing the War on Poverty as an at-
tempt "to overcome the racial barriers of the New Deal legacy" in which "[f]ederal policies 
to aid the poor quickly became linked to the civil rights movement as civil rights organiza-
tions endorsed and undertook welfare programs that targeted African-American poor"). 
81. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 19, at 1017 (noting that "growing civil unrest and riots 
[in northern cities] announced the growing problems of poverty among African-Americans 
who had moved from the South but had been unable to find well-paying jobs"). 
82. Black liberation forces, as represented by nationalist organizations such as the Nation 
of Islam, as well as the traditional, old-line civil rights organizations continue to advocate 
patriarchal ideals. Last year's Million Man March in Washington, D.C. provides the most 
recent and most visible example of such ideals in action. See Donna Franklin, Black 
Herstory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 18, 1995, at A23. See generally Darryl Pinckney, Slouching To-
ward Washington, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Dec. 21, 1995, at 73-82 (discussing both the Million 
Man March and the history of the Nation of Islam). 
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public assistance is heightened by the stigma of blackness in the 
context of white supremacy.s3 
Perhaps both Handler and Rank made conscious decisions not 
to consider race as a more significant factor in explaining why the 
myths of welfare dependency and poverty underlying the main-
stream discourse persist despite data to the contrary. The imagery 
of the poor renders them presumptively black, and the relative in-
visibility of white poverty enhances this image. Unfortunately, both 
authors avoid directly confronting these thornier issues. For exam-
ple, they do not consider the question of whether the decisional 
rights held by women on AFDC in the area of reproduction should 
be infringed because of their poverty.84 Yet, this is where white 
supremacy and the stigma of negritude merge with patriarchy and 
the stigma of single motherhood to enhance the perceived immoral-
ity of the discourse's prototype - the poor, black, inner-city single 
mother. Perhaps this is where not only the answers to the questions 
raised by both Handler and Rank lie but also where we must begin 
in order to realize a true "age of possibility." 
83. Handler's earlier observations support this. He said that: "Throughout our social 
history, racial discrimination and nativism have served to affirm dominant values, status, and 
power by defining people of color and immigrantS as deviant and degraded." Joel F. 
Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle": The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legaliza-
tion, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 935 (1990). 
84. Rank clearly considered this type of imagery. He identifies the view of women on 
AFDC as "breeding factories" as one of the myths he sets out to debunk. See Rank, p. 3. 
Still, he apparently does not consider race as significant to the imagery. Handler expresses 
more discomfort than Rank with the punitive measures advocated by the mainstream. He 
notes, "[s]ome reforms could be helpful; most are regulatory and punitive.'' Handler, p. 133. 
He endorses increased child support enforcement, but remains apprehensive about denying 
benefits to mothers under 18 years old and about family caps. See Handler, pp. 133-34. It 
appears from Handler's views about the potential of increased child support enforcement 
that he assumes that noncustodial parents of children on welfare can pay child support but 
choose not to do so. He ignores the likelihood that these parents are also poor and that their 
inability to pay child support results from the decreased wages that Handler himself dis-
cussed in chapter 3. See Handler, pp. 32-55. 
CONTEXT AND LEGITIMACY IN FEDERAL 
INDIANLAW 
Philip P. Frickey* 
BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPO-
RARY TRIBAL LIFE. By Frank Pommersheim. Los Angeles: Uni-
versity of California Press. 1995. Pp. x, 267. $30. 
Federal Indian law is perhaps the least respected and most mis-
understood area of public law. Although the field produces a 
steady diet of cases for the Supreme Court, the Justices have little 
love for the topic.1 Tue work of Indian-law scholars and practition-
ers seems isolated from the more general span of public law schol-
arship and practice. Indeed, the mere mention of the field is a 
conversation stopper for public law generalists of either the acad-
emy or the practicing bar. 
There are probably many reasons why federal Indian law is out 
of the mainstream. Some of them involve fairly typical problems of 
public law: unclear - indeed, largely nonexistent - constitutional 
text,2 murky doctrines of case law,3 the hydraulic pressure upon 
doctrine of evolving social circumstances, and so on. In addition, 
there may be some sense on the part of the dominant community 
. that the issues involved in federal Indian law are relatively unim-
portant in the great scheme of things. 
Other factors that contribute to the marginalization of the field 
are, however, more unusual. Issues concerning the rights of Native 
Americans are quite different from those involving other minority 
groups defined by race or ethnicity. Indians had sovereignty, land, 
and other group rights before their contact with colonizing Europe-
* Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1975, University of 
Kansas; J.D. 1978, University of Michigan. - Ed. Jim Chen, Daniel Farber, Neil Fulton, 
Jeffrey Rutherford, Gerald Torres, and Laura Walvoord provided helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this review essay. 
For purposes of full disclosure, I should mention that Frank Pommersheim and I have had 
many discussions about federal Indian law and once considered combining our efforts to 
produce a book in the field. -
1. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, 
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1993). 
2. The Constitution mentions Indians only three times: once to grant Congress the au-
thority to regulate commerce "with the Indian tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3, and twice 
to exclude "Indians not taxed" from the apportionment formula for the House of Represent-
atives, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
3. For a brief description of the doctrines the courts have applied to federal Indian law, 
see Frickey, supra note 1, at 418 n.158. 
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ans, and they continue to have sovereignty, land, and other group 
rights today. The wrongs colonization perpetrated were group 
wrongs rather than individuated injuries. The status of Indian 
tribes today, which involves collective land ownership, self-
government, some aspects of territorial sovereignty, ~d govern-
ment-to-government relations with the United States, is unlike any-
thing else in domestic American public law. 
Indeed, a fundamental reason for the inscrutability of federal 
Indian law is that analogies to other areas of public law tum out to 
be false. Mainstream public law attempts to protect politically pow-
erless members of minority groups from being treated differently 
from similarly situated persons who are in the majority.4 These in-
dividualistic and integrationist qualities spring from American do-
mestic norms of equal protection associated with Brown v. Board of 
Education. 5 In contrast, federal Indian law seeks to protect Indians 
as groups - as peoples, not as people6 - from forced assimilation 
and destruction of their separate status. These collectivist and sepa-
ratist qualities spring, remarkably, from international law notions of 
sovereignty, which were incorporated into American domestic law 
in the early nineteenth century by the Marshall Court.7 Surely this 
head-spinning contrast between the familiar equal-protection narra-
tive and the unfamiliar Indian law one is a major reason why fed-
eral Indian law is sealed off from the public law mainstream.s 
This exclusive focus on law is, however, highly deceiving. For I 
think it is the context of federal Indian law, even more than its 
murky doctrines and qualities, that leads to its marginalization. It is 
plain to anyone who will look that federal Indian law is the law 
governing the colonization and displacement of the indigenous peo-
ples of this continent by Europeans. .The justifications for those co-
lonial acts - acknowledged by our Supreme Court to tum on 
Christianizing the heathen and confiscating natural resources to use 
them more efficiently9 - now seem hollow. The cross-continental 
march of European-Americans, the brutality of the Indian wars and 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
6. This phrase is borrowed from the evocative title of David C. Williams, The Borders of 
the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991). 
7. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 1996). 
8. Of course, both fields have been forced to deal with racism, and the "sameness" re-
quired by the one and the "difference" protected by the other have sometimes met with 
massive resistance. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 11 (1958); Lac du Flambeau Band 
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1284, 
1286 (W.D. Wis. 1994). 
9. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832); 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 579 
(McLean, J., concurring); Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-73, 590 (1823). 
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their aftermaths, and the removal westward and ultimate isolation 
of Indians on reservations is a story painful to contemplate in a 
society supposedly premised upon a Constitution that protects 
against governmental abuse and embodies a social contract based 
on consent. The unattractiveness of this narrative, its tension with 
our dominant American narrative of faith in the rule of law, and the 
difficulty in knowing how to fuse these narratives into lessons of 
contemporary significance all contribute to the marginal status of 
federal Indian law .10 
Turning to the current context, contemporary federal Indian 
law, "on the ground," happens far away from the District of Colum-
bia, on isolated lands called Indian reservations. The people it pri-
marily affects have a third layer of citizenship - membership in the 
tribe as well as citizenship in the United States and in the state in 
which they reside - and may consider tribal membership the most 
significant of the three. They may also adhere to some traditional 
beliefs and ways of life inconsistent with western, capitalist values. 
Indeed, it is no small irony that Native Americans are essentially 
foreigners in their own country,11 both culturally and legally.12 
Traditional public law scholarship has its difficulties in coming 
to grips with such far-flung and foreign factors. Frank 
Pommersheim has sought to identify these deficiencies and to begin 
to remedy them in his new book, Braid of Feathers: American In-
dian Law and Contemporary Tribal Life. Pommersheim brings a 
wealth of experience to the task. He spent over ten years living and 
working on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. Now 
a law professor at the University of South Dakota, Pommersheim 
sits as an appellate judge for both the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. 
Pommersheim approaches the subject as much with his heart as 
his head. He acknowledges that his experiences in Indian country 
have been highly rewarding, both personally and professionally 
(p. 6). Indeed, he speaks frankly of his friendship toward and obli-
gations to "people and communities who have done so much, with 
10. Consider a historian's perspective on why Indian-white history "occupies a backwater 
status" in that profession: 
The majority of American historians seem to regard the whole issue as an endless tale of 
woe and atrocity committed mostly against Indians, a litany many find redundant, tire-
some, and depressing. More pointedly, the Indian experience is viewed, and so treated, 
as a curious, even quaint sideshow within the larger panorama of Anglo-American per-
formance and achievement in North America. 
Calvin Martin, An Introduction Aboard the Fidele, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND nm 
PROBLEM OF HISTORY 3, 9 (Calvin Martin ed., 1987). 
11. The point is made well by the title of Robert N. Clinton's excellent article defending 
tribal sovereignty, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian 
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979 (1981). 
12. Oddly, the field of public law most similar to federal Indian law is immigration law. 
See Frickey, supra note 7. 
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lasting good humor, to highlight the issues and enhance the choices 
in my own life and those of my family" (p. 13). He recognizes that 
his view "is not detached nor neutral but engaged and committed" 
(p. 5), a product of his experiences "in the particular western land-
scape of Indian country in South Dakota" (p. 6). 
This abandonment of any pretense of objective, neutral analysis, 
however, does not undermine his contribution. Indeed, it seems to 
me that it greatly enhances it, for it replaces the typical, and mis-
leading, "view from nowhere"13 with the actual context of rele-
vance. For as Pommersheim notes, most federal Indian law 
scholarship focuses almost exclusively on "the pervasive role of 
Congress and the Supreme Court" (p. 1), failing to acknowledge 
"the counterweight of tribal sovereignty and authority" (p. 1) and 
"the understanding and implementation of the indigenous vision 
that develops in its localized institutional settings" (p. 2). 
This, then, is a self-proclaimed "inside-out view from the grass-
roots, reservation level rather than the traditional top-down view 
that permeates most Indian law writing" (p. 2). What 
Pommersheim seeks for tribes is legitimacy in law running in both 
directions. Tribal governmental institutions, particularly tribal 
courts, must have "tribal authenticity," and this " 'inside-out' au-
thenticity, in turn, must meet the potential constraints of [federal] 
judicial and congressional review that is necessary to achieve a com-
plementary 'top-down' authenticity" (p. 134). "In many ways," 
Pommersheim says, "tribal courts are ideally situated to serve as a 
bridge between local tribal culture and the dominant legal system" 
(p. 194). Bi-directional connectedness and legitimacy, in turn, 
could lead to a "true tribal-federal (judicial) dialogue on tribal sov-
ereignty" that seeks "justice [as] a product of conversation rather 
than unilateral declaration."14 Ultimately, this institutional dia-
logue is the vehicle by which Pommersheim hopes to achieve what 
he sees as "the two most important - indeed, complementary -
projects in the field of federal Indian law ... the decolonization of 
13. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986). 
14. P. 193. It is for these reasons that Pommersheim focuses on tribal courts rather than 
other tribal institutions, such as tribal councils. The linkage between tribal sovereignty and 
tribal courts, on the one hand, and federal courts and the broader national govemment, on 
the other, is by no means obvious, however. As I understand it, and as I shall explain in the 
remainder of this review, Pommersheim's argument is that tribal courts are the tribal institu-
tions best situated to perform a translational role, articulating the nature of tribal sovereignty 
and other interests so that non-Indian authorities can understand them; a justificatory role, 
articulating tribal sovereignty and interests in ways that provide persuasive reasons why non-
Indian authorities should not interfere with them; and a legitimating role, upholding impor-
tant, shared national values through appropriate judicial processes so that federal courts will 
not second-guess tribal court adjudicative results and will trust tribal courts to review the 
actions of tribal councils and executive officials. Each of these tasks is part of the tribal-
federal judicial dialogue in the pursuit of justice that Pommersheim seeks to foster. 
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federal Indian law and the simultaneous construction of an indige-
nous version of tribal sovereignty and self-rule."15 
Heady stuff, this. Openly utopian and yet concretely contextual, 
Pommersheim asks us to imagine a decolonized federal Indian law 
and a :flourishing tribal life, all with the support of the dominant 
society. True to his "inside-out" approach, he first considers the 
reservation context, _places the reservation within its broader con-
text in the western United States, and then uses these contextual 
understandings as the bases for crafting the legal context to achieve 
the two goals he identifies. I will consider each in turn. 
I. A CONTEXT FOR CARING 
Pommersheim is explicit in his rationale for examining the con-
text of federal Indian law: 
I seek to develop a sense of context - cultural, spiritual, and physical 
- to help explain why Indian people are committed to reservation 
life and why non-Indians need to honor and respect that commitment. 
For it is this commitment to the reservation as place that undergirds 
all the central legal struggles in Indian country about land, water, nat-
ural resources, and jurisdiction. Unless we understand this context, 
there is little chance that we can forge a commitment to eradicate the 
stigma of invidious difference while at the same time preserving an 
enduring pride of difference. Without the human and cultural specif-
ics, the field of Indian law is hopelessly abstract and disconnected 
from the reality and aspiration of contemporary tribal life. The thick 
description of the reservation as place provides a context for caring as 
well as a firm grounding for understanding the pain and promise of 
law in contemporary Indian life. [p. 8] 
In my judgment, the major contribution of this book lies in the 
identification and substantial satisfaction of these aspirations. 
By its very nature, federal Indian law is the law of colonial 
power - case law from what John Marshall once revealingly called 
"the Courts of the conqueror,"16 statutes from the centralized legis-
lature of the colonial government, and so on. It is law made by 
others and imposed upon indigenous peoples. It is both unsurpris-
ing and disturbing, then, that, as Vine Deloria once wrote, "what is 
missing in federal Indian law are the Indians."17 
15. P. 193. One problem inherent in this project is that federal law will necessarily struc-
ture this institutional relationship, and federal lawmakers will have the usual presumptions 
that federal law is nationwide and uniform. Indian tribes and their members have great di-
versity across this country, and yet it seems inevitable that tribal institutions and tribal law 
will have to bend in somewhat similar ways to fit such a national, federal framework. 
Whether these centripetal and centrifugal forces can be adequately harnessed by working 
institutions is, thus, a major question. 
16. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 {1823) .. 
17. Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content 
and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 Aruz. L. REV. 203, 205 {1989). 
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Law created by judges and legislators this far removed from its 
context is not likely to be functional, attractive, or legitimate in the 
eyes of those it most directly affects. Similarly, the legal scholars' 
penchant for analysis generated within the four walls of their of-
fices, grudgingly supplemented by occasional forays into the law li-
brary, cannot possibly produce a fully useful examination of law in 
this context. To be sure, high-level theory, as well as the careful 
parsing of precedent and other basic legal-process skills, have their 
role in federal Indian law, as in all other law. The problem remains, 
however, that under legal-process assumptions "[l]aw is a doing of 
something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the 
basic problems of social living. "18 It is self-evident that law cannot 
perform this function without an appreciation of the social setting 
in question and the values and aspirations of the people the legal 
regime most directly affects. More specifically, Native Americans, 
who are full-fl.edged citizens of the United States, and Indian tribes, 
which are bona fide sovereigns under domestic American law, de-
serve equal concern and respect in the process by which our na-
tional government, through law, carries out its responsibility of 
" 'establishing, maintaining and perfecting the conditions necessary 
for community life to perform its role in the complete development 
of [people].' "19 
The centerpiece of Pommersheim's contextual presentation is 
Chapter One, which is a slightly modified version of a law review 
article he published some years ago.20 The title, The Reservation as 
Place, bespeaks the sort of dignity he seeks to bestow upon locales 
often viewed "as islands of poverty and despair tom from the conti-
nent of national progress" (p. 11). Pommersheim attempts to con-
vey the 
[h]idden ... notion of the reservation as place: a physical, human, 
legal, and spiritual reality that embodies the history, dreams, and aspi-
rations of Indian people, their communities, and their tribes. It is a 
place that marks the endurance of Indian communities against the on-
slaught of a marauding European society; it is also a place that holds 
the promise of fulfillment. [p. 11] 
He writes "from two overarching assumptions. One is that, despite 
grinding poverty and widespread despair, there is nevertheless a 
flame of hope and a broadening range of choices in almost all as-
pects of reservation life" (p. 13). The other "is that, whatever the 
18. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 148 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). 
19. Id. at 102 (quoting Joseph M. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GOVERNMENT 
UNDER LAW 91, 96 (Arthur Sutherland ed., 1968)). 
20. See Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L. 
REv. 246 {1989). 
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conditions, tribal members have been committed to remaining in-
delibly Indian, proudly defining themselves as a people apart and 
resisting full incorporation into the dominant society around them" 
(p. 13). 
In my judgment, this essay largely succeeds in making the 
reader not only understand, but also empathize with, Indians' rea-
sons for having a fundamental and spiritual attachment to the reser-
vation. At the same time, it does not romanticize the reservation as 
some idyllic setting21 or engage in a self-satisfied jeremiad excoriat-
ing non-Indians.22 Achieving the former without pandering along 
the lines of the latter is no mean feat. 
Pommersheim begins with a short explanation of the centrality 
of land to Indian people: "Land is basic to Indian people; they are 
part of it and it is part of them; it is their Mother" (p. 13). The land 
is simultaneously the source of cultural connectedness, "of spiritual 
origins and sustaining myth," (p.14) and "a homeland where gener-
ations and generations of relatives have lived out their lives and 
destiny" (p. 14). He then turns to the legal genesis of reservations 
as the result of a bargained-for exchange. Usually through a treaty 
with the federal government, the tribe ceded away some aboriginal 
lands and agreed to cease hostilities with non-Indians in exchange 
for a guaranteed homeland of vital cultural significance over which 
the tribe would exercise significant sovereignty. He then addresses 
attacks upon this "measured separatism,"23 focusing on the allot-
ment of reservation lands to individual tribal members and the 
opening of remaining reservation lands to non-Indian homesteaders 
(pp. 19-21). He also considers the assimilative efforts of Christian 
missionaries, Bureau of Indian Affairs agents, and teachers in In-
dian country to destroy tribal culture, religion, and language. Par-
ticularizing this inquiry, he reviews the South Dakota experience, 
21. See p. 34 (noting the "rupture in the relationship of the people to the land" and com-
plaining about "disturbing utopian visions that endlessly romanticize the people and the 
land"). The current legal analogue to this problem of romanticism might be found in cases 
suggesting that tribes have more sovereignty in situations in which they are engaged in tradi-
tional ways. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 492 U.S. 408, 441-44 (1989) (holding that tribe may zone land owned by non-Indians 
only in portion of the reservation traditionally closed to the public, where few non-Indian 
lands are located and the area approximates a pristine region retaining uniquely Indian char-
acter); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 733 (1983) (implying that tribal sovereignty is greatest 
where there has been "a tradition of tribal self-government" on the subject of dispute); 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 (1980) 
(stating that tribal interest in raising revenue by marketing goods to non-Indians is "strongest 
when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation"). 
22. See p. 5 (stating that the point is "not to excoriate the 'white man' " but rather "to 
look to a more humane and morally coherent era that is based in the core values of respect 
and dignity"); p. 21 ("The point is not to assign blame - an essentially fruitless exercise -
but rather to comprehend more deeply the forces at work on the reservation."). 
23. P. 16 (using a term from CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND 
nIE LAW 4 (1986)). 
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where all reservations suffered through allotment and other Indian 
lands were lost to Missouri River water projects. 
Pommersheim concludes with a consideration of the reservation 
within the broader context of the American West. He argues that 
"[d]espite the pervasive conflict between tribes and the state and 
federal governments, and between Indians and non-Indians, other 
more unitive factors point to similarities in situation that are often 
not perceived and occasionally even ignored" (p. 27). Indians and 
non-Indians alike in the West share space, aridity, a love of their 
land, and a complicated relationship with the federal government. 
Tribes are often criticized as being too dependent on federal lar-
gesse. Pommersheim correctly points out, however, that their non-
Indian neighbors are similarly dependent on the federal govern-
ment and survive through farm subsidies and below-market access 
to grazing, water, and other public goods.24 He suggests that the 
future for both sides is inextricably linked, and if each would "rec-
ognize the permanence and legitimacy of the other" (p. 30) and en-
gage in dialogue, much common ground could be identified and 
usefully exploited. In particular, both sides might be able to de-
velop an overlapping sense of place.25 
For me, this chapter is the cornerstone of the book. It speaks to 
me in a multitude of ways, providing factual information, cultural 
perspective, and normative insight. It goes a long way toward fill-
ing the yawning chasm between federal Indian law in the books and 
federal Indian law on the ground. Moreover, I take some solace 
from it. The chapter ends on a note of hope,26 a commodity all too 
scarce in federal Indian law. 
24. Yet the Westerners' fierce sense of independence and their resentment of the federal 
government make all this a strange mix, aptly summed up in the injunction to "'[g]et out, and 
give us more money.'" P. 28 (quoting WALLACE STEGNER, THE AMERICAN WESr AS L1V1No 
SPACE 15 (1987)). 
25. Thus, Pommetsheim's defense of tribal sovereignty builds on legal themes - preex-
isting rights (to sovereignty and land), unconsented deprivations of these rights (unilateral 
colonization and displacement of indigenous peoples, forced assimilation), and bilateral legal 
acknowledgment of those rights (in treaties) -and on cultural themes - the importance of 
the land and self-determination to Indian culture. For these reasons, in this context there is 
an intimate connection between sovereignty and individual and group rights. In this instance, 
at least, sovereignty is more than simply the rights or authority of a government. 
26. Consider its final paragraph: 
The breath of despair once so prevalent in Indian country seems to be yielding to the 
air of hope. The answers to these troubling questions about the land and its economic, 
cultural, and spiritual roles do not readily reveal themselves, but the questions are in-
creasingly recognized and energetically posed. Nor are these questions confined to Indi-
ans and reservations. They also pierce with unerring aim the larger society's 
assumptions about cultural diversity and the use and exploitation of the earth to sustain 
economic prodigality and waste. The questions inevitably challenge all of us - Indian 
and non-Indian, tribes and states alike - to summon the honor and wisdom of our-
selves, our communities, and our traditions and to apply them to these relentless and 
provocative issues. 
P. 36. 
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With all that said, the chapter may not work for everyone. I 
have assigned the underlying law review article to my students in 
federal Indian law for several years running. Many students find 
the article worthwhile, but some have difficulty internalizing the 
material. For them, it may seem too sentimental, too much a mat-
ter of airy hopefulness about an environment and the people who 
populate it.27 The hopefulness of the essay may also strike some 
persons as a dated indicium of a short period in South. Dakota's 
recent history when non-Indians seemed especially receptive to 
conversations with Indians.28 Nonetheless, the impetus to care 
about the context of federal Indian law, along with significant per-
spectives on that context, strike me as an invaluable contribution to 
the field. 
II. CONTEXTUAL LEGITIMACY FOR TRIBAL LAW 
AND TRIBAL COURTS 
As I understand it, one of Pommersheim's most basic goals is to 
persuade the broader non-Indian legal community to care enough 
In a later chapter, Pommersheim proposes that tribes and states should attempt to abjure 
litigation and engage in dialogue to reach accords on fundamental issues. See pp. 153-61. 
27. To be sure, these reactions may be a product of when the students read the essay. My 
students and I discuss it at the beginning of the course, as a way to introduce the reservation 
context and the importance of federal law to it. At that point, the students may be unable to 
synthesize legal doctrine and context sufficiently to profit optimallly from the reading. None-
theless, it seems important to begin the course with an exposure to this context that is so 
foreign to many students, and I know of no other writing that works as well as this essay. 
Rereading the essay at the end of the course may be necessary for a fuller appreciation of 
it. Indeed, when I asked a policy question in my most recent federal Indian law examination, 
several students not only mentioned this article, but also commented on how the analysis in it 
had informed their perspectives. 
A more fundamental problem may be that students expect doctrinal analysis when, in 
fact, Pommersheim is attempting to provide the context for his basically nondoctrinal, post-
modern approach to federal Indian law. See infra text accompanying notes 47-61. Essen-
tially, the "reservation as place" is a relational and constitutive concept - focusing on the 
deep relationships of Indians to the land and to each other and how that is constitutive of 
individual, collective, and geographical identity - more than a traditional legal concept, 
based on the law of property, that divorces "things" from the people who "own" them. I am 
grateful to Jeff Rutherford, my former student, for this insight. In future classes, I shall at-
tempt to determine whether a more forthright confrontation between post-modern analysis 
and traditional legal conceptions would be fruitful. 
28. The Reservation as Place was published in the South Dakota Law Review in 1989. 
See supra note 20. Chapter 5 of the book, entitled Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Fu-
ture?, originally appeared at 36 S.D. L. REV. 239 (1991). In that period, the state was head-
long in its centennial celebration of 1989, which provoked extended discussion of the history 
and present-day situation of Indians in the state. Governor Mickelson declared 1990 the 
Year of Reconciliation, a time for attempts at meaningful state-tribal dialogue. See pp. 154, 
251 n.89. Contrast a recent comment of the current governor, Bill Janklow, alleging that 
South Dakota Indian tribes have a "master plan .•. to acquire all of western South Dakota" 
with proceeds from Indian gaming, which was immediately attacked as exacerbating racial 
tensions. Janklow Says Tribes Have "Master Plan" To Buy Western South Dakota, Associated 
Press Political Service, Aug. 25, 1995, available in Westlaw, ASSOCPPS .File, 1995 WL 
6739295. . • 
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about the Indian context to provide tribes a breathing space for the 
construction of institutions, particularly tribal courts, that can de-
velop a truly indigenous law. His message is a timely one, for tribal 
court jurisdiction may well now be expansive enough to create this 
opportunity. 
Understanding this jurisdictional context requires a brief over-
view of the nature and limits of tribal sovereignty. One of the most 
basic premises of federal Indian law is that, prior to contact with 
Europeans, tribes had sovereignty over their members and their ar-
eas.29 The European encounter locked each tribe into an exclusive 
sovereign-sovereign relationship with the "discovering" European 
country, such that the tribe could have sovereign relations and en-
gage in land transactions only with that country.3o This category of 
limitations on tribal sovereignty based on tribes' status as "domestic 
dependent nations"31 was more recently expanded to deny any 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians32 and to restrict civil regula-
tory control over non-Indians on lands within reservations that they 
own in fee simple.33 In addition, of course, tribes have lost author-
ity consensually - through treaty agreements, for example - and 
nonconsensually, when Congress, through the exercise of its judi-
cially sanctioned "plenary power" over Indian affairs,34 has explic-
itly preempted tribal power.3s What all this means is that tribes 
retain sovereignty today so long as the particular exercise of power 
is not inconsistent with domestic dependent status and has never 
been ceded or taken away. 
That reservoir of sovereignty turns out to be significant.36 For 
tribal courts, it includes the authority to exercise criminal jurisdic-
29. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-73 (1823). 
30. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573-74. 
31. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831}. 
32. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). The Court later 
held that tribes also lack the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indi-
ans - that is, Indians who are members of a tribe different from the one attempting to 
exercise the criminal jurisdiction in question. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). 
Congress has overturned this result by a statute that purports to recognize the tribe's inher-
ent sovereignty in this situation, rather than to delegate federal authority to the tribes. See 25 
u.s.c. § 1301(2) (1994). 
33. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). 
34. For a helpful overview, see Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its 
Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984). 
35. Under the canons of interpretation found in federal Indian law precedents, Congress 
must act clearly before courts will sanction an invasion of Indian interests. See Frickey, supra 
note 1, at 398-426. A recent example of preemption of tribal power is South Dakota v. Bour-
land, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1993) (holding that a federal statute taking Indian lands for public 
recreation area that remained within reservation divested tribe of authority to regulate non-
members in that area). 
36. In addition to presumptive full legislative sovereignty over its members, tribes have 
been recognized as retaining certain legislative authority over nonmembers, including, for 
example, the power to tax nonmembers engaged in consensual economic activity in Indian 
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tion over members37 and over nonmember Indians,38 and to ex-
clude most nonmembers from the reservation.39 Tribal judicial 
jurisdiction in civil cases is quite extensive. · State courts have no 
inherent jurisdiction to entertain causes of action against Indians 
that arise on the reservation.40 Because such suits will rarely in-
volve diversity of citizenship, a federal question, or the like, a fed-
eral judicial forum ordinarily will not be available, and thus they 
must almost always be brought in tribal court. Moreover, while tri-
bal courts may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,41 
entertaining a reservation-based civil cause of action against a non-
Indian is not foreclosed. The Supreme Court has held that federal 
courts have federal-question jurisdiction to hear the non-Indian's 
objection that this tribal-court jurisdiction is inconsistent with do-
mestic dependent status.42 Nonetheless, the non-Indian must first 
exhaust all tribal court remedies, including appellate ones,43 and, if 
the matter does return to the federal district court, the only issue is 
whether the tribal court had jurisdiction.44 
Finally, it remains the case that the Constitution does not con-
strain the exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty in general or the 
activities of tribal courts in particular.45 Congress applied many 
constitutional limitations to the tribes, however, by adopting the 
country. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 198-200 (1985); Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-38 (1982). 
37. See United States v. Wheeler. 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978). 
38. See supra note 32. 
39. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990) (dictum). 
40. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1959). Of course, Congress may change 
this rule through the exercise of its plenary power, as it did in adopting Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, §§ 401-02, 82 Stat. 73, 78-79 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1321-1322 (1994)), a statute that authorizes courts in certain states to assume jurisdiction 
over civil and criminal cases arising in Indian country. 
41. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
42. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 853 (1985). 
43. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987). 
44. See Iowa Mutua~ 480 U.S. at 19. See generally Timothy W. Juranko, Exhaustion of 
Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: To-
ward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the Federal Judicial System, 78 MINN. L. REv. 
259 (1993); Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty 
While Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (1995); Alex Tallchief Skibine, 
Deference Owed Tribal Courts' Jurisdictional Determinations: Towards Co-Existence, Under-
standing, and Respect Between Different Cultural and Judicial Norms, 24 N.M. L. REv. 191 
(1994). 
45. This understanding is as old as Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that 
because tribal sovereignty existed prior to the Constitution and is not derived from it, tribal 
action is not subject to the Constitution). Of course, if the tribe is exercising delegated 
federal authority rather than inherent tribal sovereignty, a strong argument can be made that 
the Constitution attaches. Cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 553-56 {1975) (uphold-
ing federal statute authorizing tribe to regulate liquor in Indian country, including when sold 
by non-Indians, and conceptualizing the statute as delegating authority to the tribe rather 
than recognizing the tribe's inherent powers). 
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Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).46 Consistent with 
Pommersheim's comparative institutional sensitivity, however, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the ICRA narrowly, holding that 
the statute embodies no implied private right of action for civil re-
lief in federal court.47 Thus, ICRA claims are the domain of the 
tribal courts, which therefore have the opportunity to place an in-
digenous interpretation on Anglo-American concepts such as due 
process and equal protection. 
After providing an overview of this terrain (pp. 79-98), 
Pommersheim focuses his attention on a fundamental dilemma. 
Within this shared federal-tribal judicial domain, tribal courts can 
function well only if they have legitimacy both in the tribe and in 
the federal system. Without this dual legitimacy, the tribal courts 
are doomed to ineffectiveness, for they will be either outsider fed-
eral agencies without any tribal support or indigenous actors lack-
ing the federal backing necessary to withstand attack within the 
broader legal system. Yet there is great tension in this enterprise, 
for the indigenous qualities that may foster legitimacy within the 
tribe may undercut the legal-process values necessary for legitimacy 
within the broader legal community as well as within some seg-
ments of the tribal community itself. 
Pommersheim sees the issue essentially as an overlapping prob-
lem of the construction of legal institutions and law. Tribal courts 
must have the legitimacy necessary both within the tribe and the 
federal system to elaborate a body of law that itself will be legiti-
mate from the dual perspectives of the tribe and the federal courts. 
Thus, in Chapter Three, he considers ways to foster the institutional 
legitimacy of tribal courts, and, in Chapter Four, he turns to how 
the jurisprudence of tribal courts might unfold. He speaks, of 
course, from the practical experience of a sitting tribal appellate 
judge.48 
His general prescriptions are, it seems to me, quite appropriate. 
He is right to suggest that, once tribal courts attain the formal legiti-
macy necessary under the rule of law - for example, they are duly 
established by a federally recognized tribe - they should ·concen-
trate on developing a contextual legitimacy running simultaneously 
in two directions (the tribal and the federal) more than on other, 
more formal institutional matters. To illustrate the problem, con-
sider a fundamental issue of the formal and the functional: the ab-
sence of a separation of powers in many tribal constitutions, and the 
46. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, §§ 201-203, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301-1303 (1994)). 
47. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59-72 (1978) (finding only remedy 
enforceable in federal court is habeas corpus). 
48. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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real possibility that the tribal government may refuse to obey a tri-
bal court decision or might even attack the institution of tribal 
courts itself by seeking to remove the judge or abolish the judiciary. 
As a formal matter, one might attempt to remedy this situation by 
seeking an amendment to the tribal constitution. Presented this ab-
stractly, however, why should tribal members support this reform? 
For what practical and experiential reasons might they wish to in-
vest such faith in often untested tribal courts?49 In place of formal 
reform based on abstract political theory and leaps of faith, 
Pommersheim seems to suggest that the tribal courts must make 
their legitimacy the old-fashioned way-. they must earn it, through 
the hard, even courageous work of developing an authentic indige-
nous jurisprudence that nonetheless accords with the fundamental 
Anglo-American legal-process values expected by both the federal 
courts and many tribal members. 
More particularly, to foster the contextual legitimacy of tribal 
courts, Pommersheim proposes that these courts focus on bringing 
together the practitioners involved with them - attorneys as well 
as tribal advocates without any formal legal training - "to form a 
community helping to carry out an important legitimating function" 
(p. 71). A tribal bar examination, tribal ethics code, and programs 
of continuing legal education would foster the development of a 
professional community that both actually serves the tribal and fed-
eral communities well and creates the patina of professionalism that 
will lend confidence to the whole operation. More generally, the 
tribal bar could become a unique interpretive community that could 
guide the difficult process of molding tribal-court adjudication to 
serve the twin functions of tribal and federal legitimacy. 
Pommersheim is surely right to seek such a cooperative effort in 
the construction of contextual legitimacy for tribal courts. After all, 
as Steven Burton has explained in a work on which Pommersheim 
relies,50 it is the work of the legal interpretive community within its 
49. Lest this seem a question with an obvious answer, consider whether Americans today 
would support the institution of Marbury v. Madison-style judicial review if a new Constitu-
tion were being drafted and submitted to a plebiscite. The much-debated "counter-
majoritarian difficulty" that envelops much public-law scholarship is usually discussed at the 
level of abstract political and moral philosophy. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962). 
The people, in place of the scholars, would see the issue much more practically, I would 
think, and their views will depend upon their own encounters with the judiciary and their 
practical fears or hopes concerning a political and administrative process unconstrained by 
constitutional judicial review. The people's own narrative relationship with the story of 
Brown - or the story of Roe, or the story of police practices in their communities, and so on 
- would surely have more persuasive force than a scholar's theoretical contributions. 
Similarly, when the federal government investigates the operations of tribal courts, it ex-
amines the day-to-day successes and failures, not mere abstract principles such as tribal sov-
ereignty or the separation of powers. See p. 132. 
SO. Seep. 223 n.49 (citing STEVEN BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL 
REASONING (1985}). 
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complex, controversial, but substantially overlapping web of beliefs 
that specifies the processes and substance of law, as well as its legiti-
macy, far more than formal deduction from first principles. More-
over, this linkage of education concerning the unique aspects of 
indigenous law and tribal courts with the role of a professional com-
munity is reminiscent of Richard Posner's suggestion concerning 
the most basic goals of legal education.51 
Pommersheim maintains this antiformalist theme when more di-
rectly considering the substance of tribal law. Here he firmly ties 
himself to the mast of much postmodern legal scholarship. Based 
on the work of Martha Minow,52 he posits a dilemma of difference 
in this context - when should we view tribal institutions and law as 
different from their dominant-society counterparts in order to re-
flect authentic values, and when would we see such visions of differ-
ences as stigmatizing and hindering the goals of legitimating them 
within both the tribe and the dominant society? He posits three 
tribal-court tools for carving out legitimate differences: language, 
narrative, and the pursuit of justice (p. 103). 
In essence, he posits a hermeneutical tribal approach to de-
ploying and interpreting legal language in a manner that holds some 
promise of legitimate legal evolution and reform.s3 Narratives by 
tribal courts can educate the dominant society about competing cul-
tural and moral visions, as well as demonstrate concrete reasons 
why these courts might give little force to some aspects of law im-
posed upon them from above. Pommersheim illustrates this point 
of tribal counternarrative by mentioning a tribal appellate opinion 
he wrote that skeptically viewed a provision of the tribal constitu-
tion limiting civil judicial jurisdiction over non-Indians because it 
51. As Posner notes: 
The most important thing that law school imparts to its students is a feel for the outer 
bounds of permissible legal argumentation at the time when the education is being im-
parted. (Later those bounds will change, of course.) What "thinking like a lawyer" 
means is not the use of special analytic powers but an awareness of approximately how 
plastic law is at the frontiers - neither infinitely plastic, ••• nor rigid and predeter-
mined, as many laypersons think - and of the permissible "moves" in arguing for, or 
against, a change in the law. It is neither method nor doctrine, but a repertoire of ac-
ceptable arguments and a feel for the degree and character of doctrinal stability, or, 
more generally, for the contours of a professional culture - a professional culture lova-
ble to some, hateful to others. 
RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1990). 
52. Seep. 235 n.1 (citing MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990)). 
53. 
Reading has two faces. One is the text or source of law anchored in some time past. The 
second is the current situation of the reader presently seeking to understand the text and 
to apply it to the situation at hand. The resulting "reading,'' whatever it is, meshes two 
times, two places, and two interpretations. This process is essentially dialectic in nature 
and entertains (at least theoretically} the possibility of the emergence of a new synthesis 
that is less lethal or even nonlethal. As the legal reader must respect the text, however 
oppressive it might be, so too the text must respect the reader's aspiration and otherness. 
P.104. 
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was the result not of indigenous concerns but rather of unilateral 
intrusion by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (pp. 108-09). Embracing 
the work of James Boyd White (pp. 112-15), Pommersheim views 
the pursuit of justice as an act of "translation," the liberating of 
legal texts from any obsolete associations surrounding their origin 
and the transformation of meaning in light of current context. 
These hermeneutical, narrative, and translational moves, Pommer-
sheim suggests, should incorporate the emerging international 
human rights norms concerning indigenous persons (pp. 123-26) 
and suggest concrete modifications of federal public law, including 
the abandonment of the plenary power doctrine,54 greater respect 
and autonomy for tribal sovereignty, and a more coherent set of 
doctrines (pp. 120-22). 
Although much of his analysis has the signature of recent hu-
manistic legal scholarship, he ends this discussion with a nod to in-
stitutional imperatives in law that would make any traditional legal-
process scholar proud. For Pommersheim, "all significant public 
values are realized through institutions. Better institutions are es-
sential to better lives" (p. 131). The failure of federal Indian law to 
pay sufficient attention to this issue has "create[ d] a grossly dis-
torted picture of the relationship of law to sovereignty" (p. 131) in 
the field that unduly values the mere federal endorsement of the 
concepts of tribal sovereignty and tribal courts without concerning 
itself with the actual development of flourishing institutions with 
appropriate procedures.55 
It is in this discussion, I think, that Pommersheim himself runs 
into an essentially insoluble dilemma - not one of difference, but 
of diffusiveness. He talks about the importance of concrete con-
text, but much of the presentation is made secondhand, through 
postmodern, abstract scholarly moves. This is an inevitable prob-
lem in antiformalist legal scholarship, but it is an acute one in this 
context, where tribal courts and law are especially foreign to 
readers. 
I know of no way to solve this difficulty. Enlightening the ab-
stract discussions of dilemmas of difference, narratives, justice as 
translation, and so on, through the use of examples is, however, 
surely an ameliorative technique. Pommersheim does attempt to 
do just that. For example, he refers to those involved in the tribal 
judicial system as working together in many small ways in the 
shared enterprise of moving tribal courts toward legitimacy (pp. 59, 
127-28). He highlights a field trip his class took to the Rosebud 
54. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
55. Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 18, at 3-6 (conducting a legal-process analysis of the 
development and operation of a system of institutionalized procedures for settling societal 
questions). 
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Sioux Tribal Court, where the chief judge told the students about 
his efforts to promote the legitimacy of the court by traveling 
throughout the small communities on the reservation and talking 
with tribal members about the work of the court. The class also 
observed the judge handle an intrafamily dispute, in which he fol-
lowed tribal custom in essentially allowing the parties to speak 
without interruption and in their native language.56 Pommersheim 
refers to various provisions of tribal law to illustrate jurisdictional 
issues (pp. 79, 85-87) and law reform (pp. 127-28). He uses several 
tribal court opinions to exemplify the application of tribal law 
against the backdrop of federal authority.57 He reminds practition-
ers that tribal courts are the authoritative expositors of tribal law, 
and thus that state cases are not dispositive and decisions of other 
tribal courts might be persuasive (pp. 128-29). 
Pommersheim does not supplement these firsthand South Da-
kota experiences with those found in tribal courts elsewhere. That 
choice is defensible, for a wider sweep might have diluted his focus. 
Nonetheless, the interested reader would profit from an examina-
tion of the literature on other tribal courts.58 In particular, if the 
separation of powers and tribal court independence are major con-
cerns, as Pommersheim (pp. 68, 73-74) and others59 have explained, 
an examination of these subjects both from Pommersheim's South 
56. See pp. 69-70; see also pp. 131-32 (noting that the chief judge holds week-long court 
open house, hosts presentations about the court, and has organized an advisory group con-
cerning tribal court practice that is the precursor to a bar association). 
57. See pp. 88-89 (observing that one tribal court adopted "minimum contacts" test of 
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), for due process limits on tribal court 
jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994)); supra text 
accompanying note 54. 
58. See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Oklahoma's Tribal Courts: A Prologue, The First Fifteen 
Years of the Modern Era, and a Glimpse at the Road Ahead, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 5 
(1994); Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SoUNo L. REV. 231 
(1987); Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 Aruz. L. REV. 225 
(1989); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 
225 (1994); Jayne Wallingford, The Role of Tradition in the Navajo Judiciary: Reemergence 
and Revival, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 141 (1994); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It": 
Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REv. 175 (1994); Frederic Brandfon, Comment, Tradi-
tional and Judicial Review in the American Tribal Court System, 38 UCLA L. REV. 991 
(1991); Daniel L. Lowery, Note, Developing a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The Nav-
ajo Experience, 1969-1992, 18 AM. IND. L. REv. 379 (1993). On the relationship of tribal 
courts to the larger judicial system, see Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal 
Union, 26 W1LLAMETIE L. REv. 841 (1990); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian 
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 671 (1989). 
59. See, e.g., Brandfon, supra note 58, at 1006-09; Valencia-Weber, supra note 58, at 238 
n.40. 
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Dakota perspective6o and from elsewhere61 would seem especially 
useful. Pommersheim acknowledges the importance of the issue 
and opines that "[m]any tribes are sensitive to this problem and 
have moved to a policy of de facto, if not de jure, separation of 
powers" (p. 74). His support for this generalization, however, rests 
only on his own personal experiences in South Dakota and on con-
versations with Indian judges there (p. 225 n.71), which may leave 
some readers unsatisfied concerning the validity of the conclusion 
locally, not to mention nationally. He does note that the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe, for which he sits as an appellate judge, recently 
amended its constitution to incorporate a formal separation of pow-
ers (p. 74). 
Despite these efforts, and for all of his emphasis upon coritext, 
Pommersheim's discussion of tribal courts and law seems more ab-
stract and less intensely human than his discussion of the reserva-
tion as place. Of course, it may simply be that talking about law 
and legal institutions cannot be carried out with· the same sense of 
humanity as talking about a cultural and sovereign homeland for a 
people. The typical lawyer's joke is premised on precisely this no-
tion of the disjunction between law and the profession of lawyering 
on the one hand and life and the needs of ordinary people on the 
other. For Pommersheim, of course, the problem is essentially that 
he has joined the other side - the perspective of life in general and 
tribal members in particular - while simultaneously writing de-
scriptively and prescriptively about the law of, and the profession of 
lawyering in, tribal courts. I was not left disappointed with his dis-
cussion so much as left longing for more concrete examples and 
guidance concerning this challenging and important topic. 
60. See Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming federal dis-
trict court's refusal to intervene into Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe election dispute despite 
allegations that the tribal council had terminated a tribal judge and rescinded the tribal 
court's order requiring reapportionment of tribal council in accord with results of referen-
dum election); LeCompte v. Jewett, 12 ILR 6025, 6027 (Chy. R. Sx. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting 
Marbury approach to judicial review of actions of tribal council and undertaking judicial 
supervision of tribal elections). Presumably Pommersheim would approve of this scenario: 
the federal courts stayed their hand, and the tribal court mustered the authority to impose 
judicial review. See also p. 74 (stating that the recently amended Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 
Constitution incorporates formal separation of powers). It would have been interesting to 
read a discussion by Pommersheim of this or a similar tribal legislative-judicial confrontation. 
61. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 58, at 238 n.40. Perhaps the most famous tribal ap-
pellate court opinion imposing judicial review in the face of the hostility of tribal leaders is 
Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 189 (1978), in which the Navajo Court of Appeals 
invoked a power of judicial review even though the Navajo have no written constitution. See 
id. 
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III. CONTEXT, LEGITIMACY, AND THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 
Pommersheim is not alone in his suggestion for greater attention 
to context in federal Indian law.62 His major contributions, in my 
view, are twofold. First, his thick description of the reservation 
amounts to a translation of that context into words understandable 
by the larger legal community. Second, his analysis of the compara-
tive institutional competence of tribal courts and federal institutions 
in accurately assessing this context and working within it to create 
legal doctrines that are both functional and normatively attractive is 
a major innovation. 
True to his "inside-out" mission, Pommersheim focuses on indi-
rect routes to reform - building the tribal judicial institutions nec-
essary for an indigenous jurisprudence - rather than on direct 
doctrinal evolution of federal Indian law. To the extent that he dis-
cusses those doctrines, his most basic message is that federal Indian 
law simply should make way for the development of tribal 
jurisprudence. 
A good illustration is his complaint about the plenary power 
doctrine. Under the case law, congressional power in Indian affairs 
is essentially limitless.63 This doctrine is subject to a fairly obvious 
formal critique. It seems hopelessly inconsistent with one of the 
most basic principles of constitutional interpretation - the McCul-
loch64 understanding that Congress possesses only those powers 
delegated to it in Article I or elsewhere in the Constitution.6s 
Pommersheim alludes to this criticism (pp. 40, 44, 46-50, 120-21) 
but it seems clear that his major objection is not formal and doctri-
nal, but rather pragmatic and contextual. For tribes, the problem 
with plenary power is its "constant destabilizing threat to their very 
existence and right to self-determination" (p. 122). He urges con-
62. For relatively recent commentary, see Robert N. Clinton, Reservation Specificity and 
Indian Adjudication: An Essay on the Importance of Limited Contextualism in Indian Law, 8 
HAMLINE L. RE.v. 543 (1985); Deloria, supra note 17; Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, 
Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 18 CAL. L REV. 1137, 
1207-08, 1219-22 (1990); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response to 
"Indians as Peoples," 39 UCLA L. REv. 169 (1991). 
63. See Newton, supra note 34. 
64. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
65. As explained earlier, the only mention of Indians in Article I provides Congress with 
the authority to regulate commerce with the tribes. See supra note 2. Far from being an 
express grant of unlimited power, under ordinary textual interpretation this clause creates 
the negative inference that Congress lacks authority to regulate Indian affairs except when 
commerce is concerned. Of course, other enumerated powers - the war power, the treaty 
power, power over federal lands and the admission of new states, and the like - may aggre-
gate into a broad authority for Congress to engage in sovereign relations with tribes beyond 
the commercial context. Even when aggregated, however, Congress's authority in this area 
cannot be interpreted easily to be "plenary," if by that term unlimited authority is intended. 
See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 7; Newton, supra note 34, at 196. 
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gressional66 or judicial67 amelioration of the plenary power doc-
trine, but acknowledges the unlikelihood of such reforms in the 
immediate future.6s He places his primary hope for reform not on 
the efforts of non-Indian public officials or scholars,69 but on the 
tribal-federal institutional dialogue he has attempted to foster.10 
In the last analysis, for Pommersheim, the keys to reform in fed-
eral Indian law are translation, education, and a resulting empathy. 
Tribes are to be the primary actors, and federal and state political 
and judicial officials are left in a reactive posture - they are to 
defer rather than intrude, listen rather than command, empathize 
rather than colonize. He recognizes that "[t]he process of 
decolonization can never lead back to a precolonized society" 
(p. 99). Rather than "institutionaliz[ing] the false dichotomy of 
dominant versus indigenous" (p. 195), the reform must "synthesize 
the best of both worlds while actively seeking to achieve a sover-
eignty that realizes both the necessary federal deference and the 
normative space to make authentic and enduring tribal choices" (p. 
195). He acknowledges that "[s]uch efforts flow not from mere aca-
demic inquiry but from work of the heart and mind" (p. 200). In-
deed, he concludes the book as follows: 
Inevitably, the feather of Indian law jurisprudence will continue to 
be a prominent one in the braid of tribal life, complete with the po-
tential to advance and enrich the quality of contemporary indigenous 
(and majoritarian) life. This potential future is, however, by no 
means assured, for we must still meet the challenges of history, na-
tional diversity, and the ideal of justice. Yet we may be guided by the 
geography of hope, with its coordinates of commitment, respect, im-
agination, and engagement. [p. 200] 
In a famous and eerily parallel passage, Emily Dickinson once 
wrote that " 'hope' is the thing with feathers - That perches in the 
soul - And sings the tune without the words - And never stops 
66. See pp. 189-90 (arguing that Congress should recognize perniciousness of plenary 
power doctrine and perhaps enact statute recognizing tribal sovereignty); see also pp. 190-91 
(proposing a constitutional amendment recognizing permanence of tribes). 
67. See pp. 190-93 (asking federal courts to reinvigorate tribal·sovereignty doctrine, per-
haps in part by emulating the moral and ethical engagement Chief Justice Marshall demon-
strated to some extent in early cases). 
68. Seep. 190 (concerning congressional action); pp. 144-53, 190-91 (noting that recent 
trends in Supreme Court have been adverse to tribal interests). 
69. See p. 240 n.85 ("I believe most people in the field of Indian Jaw, but particularly at 
the state and federal level, have little understanding or 'feel' for the real threat - used often 
enough in history ... - that plenary power holds for Indian people and tribes."). 
70. Pommersheim states: 
Reassertion of the sovereignty doctrine can be greatly augmented, in part, if the courts 
pay close attention to the articulation of tribal sovereignty as it emanates from tribal 
court jurisprudence. This emerging jurisprudence contributes significantly in advancing 
the tribal voice as part of the judicial dialogue on the parameters and contemporary 
meaning of tribal sovereignty. 
P. 190. 
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- At all."71 Narratives rooted in original sin, of course, tend to 
generate this sort of a corresponding incarnation of hope as well as 
an ethic of conscience and good works. Federal Indian law, 
grounded as it is in a colonization based on dubious justifications,12 
qualifies as such a narrative. Pommersheim, who acknowledges the 
influence of theology (p. 35), including that of the liberation variety 
(pp. 105-06), sees the hope for this narrative incarnate in tribal 
courts, whose "words and actions . . . do have their own unique 
'redemptive' potential."73 
Many readers will doubt whether those institutions, which 
Pommersheim admits are new and fragile, can withstand this 
stress.74 No'reader, however, could possibly doubt his sincerity or 
his engagement. For if others in the academy and elsewhere lack 
faith in the assurance of these things hoped for, they must respect 
Pommersheim's conviction of things not seen, his courage in sub-
jecting federal InC:lian law to the mirror of life, dim though the re-
flection may be.1s In the end, no scholar should doubt his 
significant contribution to a field he rightly criticizes as removed 
from reality, impoverished of empathy, and lacking in the engage-
ment " 'of our private integrity and our public duty ... what Pascal 
called "the grandeur and the misery" of our common humanity.' "76 
71. Emily Dickinson, Poem No. 254, st. 1. 
72. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
73. P. 106. The relationship of law and religion is, of course, an immense topic well be-
yond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, I cannot resist citing a provocative recent essay by 
Harold Berman on the spiritual qualities of both that seems consistent with Pommersheim's 
underlying approach. See Harold J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 143 
(1994). One important commentator on law and religion, Milner Ball, has also published 
extensively on federal Indian law. See, e.g., MILNER S. BALL, THE WoRD AND THa LAW 
(1993); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1; 
Milner S. Ball, Introduction to Symposium, Native American Law, 28 GA. L. REV. 299 (1994); 
Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2280 
(1989). 
74. See supra note 14 (summarizing the formidable tasks Pommersheim places before 
tribal courts). 
75. Cf. Hebrews 11:1; 1 Corinthians 13:12. Hope that is seen is, after all, a contradiction 
in terms. Cf. Romans 8:24-25. 
76. P. 35 (quoting the Christian commentator Jaroslav Pelikan). 
